Getting Counter-Terrorism Right Means Democratizing the State
by Hussein Solomon
Volume 9 (2021), Number 5 (May 2021)
In 1905, John Ainsworth, a British colonial official based in Kenya wrote how the British administration governed their dominions by finding a strong personality who was loyal to the Crown and they would do everything to increase this person’s power relative to other “natives” and then make this person totally dependent on the colonial power. This was euphemistically termed “indirect rule”. The same was true of other colonial powers as they carved parts of Africa into their colonial possessions. The twin legacy of colonialism then was both authoritarianism and one in which incumbent post-colonial elites relied on their maintaining the reins of power through foreign powers.
I reflected on this twin legacy as I watched the tragic developments in Chad unfold. On the 19th April 2021, Chad’s president – Idriss Deby Itno – was killed whilst fighting rebels. His death was immediately lamented from within the region as well as from some Western capitals as a major set-back for counter-terrorism efforts in the Sahel. Chad, after all, is an integral part of the 5,000 strong Sahel G-5 force closely allied with French Operation Barkhane troops aiming to robustly engage and defeat Islamists in the region. The reaction to the Chadian President’s death explains why counter-terrorism is failing across the Sahel despite the training and equipping of armed forces, the expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars and the stationing of Western troops across the vast expanses of this desert region.
Despite being lauded for his counter-terrorism stance against radical Islamism, the late Chadian president, by his actions, served to fuel the fire of extremism in his country. Here it is instructive to note that Deby had just begun his sixth term as president of the country. He came to power via a coup against the brutal dictatorship of Hissene Habre whom he served under as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Following his capture of power in December 1990, Deby promised democratic reforms and for a short period he was treated as a savior. Despite Deby and his Patriotic Salvation Front winning all six presidential election and four parliamentary elections, all of these were marred by fraud. This fraud went beyond the political sphere. Despite Chad having the tenth largest oil reserves in Africa, it is one of the world’s poorest, ranking a measly 187 out of 189 countries on the Human Development Index. Much of the oil revenues were redirected towards his own pockets, that of his family and the wider Zaghawa clan which constitutes only 4 percent of the population. Other funds were redirected towards the purchase of weaponry whilst his own citizens languished in abject poverty. In all this Deby was supported by the former colonial power of France as well as other Western allies.
His exclusionary, corrupt and authoritarian rule encouraged rebellion as ordinary Chadians lost faith in the ballot box. Deby crushed rebellions to his rule in 2006, 2008 and 2019. In this chaos, various Islamist groups spread their pernicious influence amongst Chad’s Muslims that constitutes 55.3 percent of the total population. What is clear is that a close relationship exists between terrorism and conflict. In 2019, for instance, 96 percent of all deaths resulting from terrorism occurred in countries already experiencing conflict.
An effective counter-terrorism strategy, then, is more than merely focusing against the threat posed by a particular terrorist group itself, but also needs to reduce conflict dynamics in the country as a whole since effective counter-terrorism entails not only counter-insurgency but also conflict resolution, economic development, political accommodation and social inclusion. Conflict de-escalation does not only mean short-term measures like the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of former combatants but also entails structural measures that are medium to long-term in nature. Across the vast arid expanses of the Sahel, there are worrying trends that political violence is becoming acceptable in the public discourse as groups feel that there exists no institutional means for redress. This is especially the case where group grievance exists – whether the Kanuri in Nigeria, the Tuareg in Mali or the Fulani spread across the region. The sad truism is that terrorism is often a reaction to the historical violence of statehood and should be understood as such. Consequently, statehood needs to be less elitist and more popular. Statehood needs to be responsive, tolerant and inclusive – politically, economically and inclusive. The Global Terrorism Index is emphatic that “…governance is the most important factor that determines the size, longevity and success of a terrorist group”.
Good governance is a potent anti-dote for the likes of militant Islamist groups exploiting local grievances, whether social alienation, economic marginalization or political disenfranchisement, as they seek to gain a pernicious foothold amongst the local population growing tired of an uncaring government as we have witnessed across the Sahel. Far from supporting the despots in power, foreign countries who seek to defeat terrorism in this troubled region, should utilize their leverage over incumbent elites to open up the democratic space and thereby challenge the malevolent legacy of colonialism.
South African Bulletins Expose Extremist Viewpoints in the Middle East
by Joel Block
(International Law Research with a focus on the Middle East)
Volume 12 (2024), Number 3 (January 2024)
On 19 October 2023, a South African body called AMPSA, The Association of Muslim Professionals In South Africa, published a freely available online English language bulletin called “Jihad In The Land of Quds”. For the record, AMPSA purports to be an indigenous body with membership from the Education, Accounting, Engineering, Law and Medical fields. https://www.ampsa.org.za/bulletins/
This bulletin described religious arguments made in favour of the lethal and indiscriminate attacks waged against Israelis as well as foreign nationals living and/or working in Israel on October 7. Within this bulletin, Jihad was religiously construed and argued to be a noble endeavour.
In the English-speaking world, sourcing extremist ideology of religious violence to the point of martyrdom is actually quite unusual and hard to find. One usually needs to look to MEMRI TV for example, to find translated Arabic statements with such a radical construction.
Indeed, the modus operandi of Pro-Palestine activists in the English-speaking world generally does not involve invoking Jihad as the founding argument. The systematic methodology of these protestors is to claim an alleged moral, legal or political high ground which is Anti-Israel in nature. Occupation, Colonialism, Apartheid, Zionist Terrorism, Zionist Nazism, Netanyahu War Crimes and Genocide are the latest arguments that have gone viral on social media.
The AMPSA bulletin denounced secular statements on the Israel-Hamas conflict including reference to UN resolutions, UN charters as well as political phrases such as self-determination and legitimate armed resistance. AMPSA furthermore stated that the proposals of a one-state solution or a two-state solution is the product of a secular and colonized mindset.
AMPSA furthermore vilified disbelievers in Islam. These nations are said to fight for the devil and scheme for Satan. Israel was referred to as a tyrannical Zionist occupier and western states were referred to as a Crusader Alliance amongst the other forces of evil.
AMPSA shirked accountability for the Hamas participation in the October 7 attacks. They stated that Muslims are not answerable to any man nor organization for what they do in pursuing holy Jihad against oppressors. There is furthermore no need for Muslims to justify their actions to the nations of disbelief. AMPSA furthermore stated that believers must prepare for war. Muslims must not criticize the Mujahideen fighters. Tactical decisions may not be second-guessed nor gratuitously criticized. Their actions must be defended and if one believes they have erred, believers must pray for their forgiveness and guidance.
AMPSA however also exposed that nations of disbelief can actually become allies in order to defeat a common enemy. Co-operation with non-believing states cannot be confused with loyalty nor can it constitute advice. Muslim beliefs, analysis and identity cannot be compromised.
AMPSA and South Africa’s application to the ICJ in fact remarkably collide in a follow up bulletin entitled “The South African Government’s Referral of The State of Israel” published on 3 January 2024. Herein, AMPSA ultimately claim that the ICJ is an institution of disbelief which is known for inconsistent and selective application of its rules and laws. Jihad is re-iterated by AMPSA to be the universal solution and must be supported in every way.
In conclusion, these professional bulletins unequivocally unveil a handful of extremist viewpoints behind the violent history in the Middle East. One simply needs to research the genocidal Hamas charter for confirmation. Therefore, emotive protest lines like “Liberate Palestine” and “From The River To The Sea Palestine Will Be Free” call into question whether the activists are purporting for national liberation or concealing the ongoing religious compulsion of violent Jihad.
Boko Haram vs Islamic State
by Hussein Solomon
Centre for Gender and Africa Studies, University of the Free State
Volume 12 (2024), Number 2 (January 2024)
It was supposed to be a surprise attack. On 15th January 2024, heavily armed fighters of the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) quickly crammed themselves into seven canoes and stealthily approached the islands of Kandahar and Kaduna Ruwa just off the shores of Lake Chad. Their objective was the camp of Abou Huraryra, the leader of the Buduma wing of Boko Haram. Whilst initially having the element of surprise, ISWAP fighters soon found themselves on the backfoot as Boko Haram fighters regrouped. The battle between the militants lasted an hour. The ferocity of their engagement was evinced by the dozens of corpses which lay on the blood-soaked grass afterwards. ISWAP fighters soon retreated in only two canoes half-filled with wounded and demoralized men.
So, what accounts for these growing conflicts between the Islamist militants? In 2016, a split occurred inside Boko Haram on questions of tactics and leadership. Some within Boko Haram were appalled at the indiscriminate killing of civilians, especially fellow Muslims by their then leader, Abubakar Shekau. They argued that the orgy of violence he unleashed against other Muslims will result in drying up recruitment into their ranks. The criticism soon morphed into some openly rebelling against Shekau’s leadership generally and these forming Islamic State – West Africa Province under the leadership of Abu Musab al Barnawi. Boko Haram or, perhaps more correctly Jama’atu Ahli Sunna Lidda’adati wal-Jihad (Group of the People for Sunnah and Jihad) remained under the leadership of Shekau.
ISWAP has subsequently grown to 3,500 fighters – the largest of Islamic State’s affiliates in Africa – and is active in north-eastern Nigeria, on the border between Nigeria and Cameroon, the Lake Chad Basin as well as making inroads into southern Nigeria. Estimates of Boko Haram’s strength vary depending on sources between 6,000 and 20,000. Their areas of operations include north-eastern Nigeria, Chad, Niger, Mali and Cameroon. Given their overlapping areas of operations, perhaps it was inevitable that the two groups will clash. This clash increasingly has to do with the lucrative kidnappings for ransom operations as well as illicit contraband moving through the Lake Chad Basin. In this sense, it is difficult to separate Islamism and criminality in the region. These are intertwined. Whilst globally, terrorists have made use of criminality to fund their operations; often the lure of profit from criminal enterprise overcomes the original purpose of the organization.
Given the prevailing regional conflict system existing in the Sahel as well as toxic nature of identity politics, the attack on the 15th January is bound to further escalate tensions. The Boko Haram camp attacked were all Buduma and this ethnic group can be found across all four Lake Chad Basin countries: Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. Expect reprisal attacks on those ethnic groups supporting ISWAP. Despite not having won the military victory sought in the attack, ISWAP has secured the allegiance of many in the neglected communities in the Lake Chad Basin by digging wells, attempting to prevent cattle rustling and providing some semblance of health care to locals in exchange for a “tax”.
The 15th January attack has however underlined the fragmentation of terror groups operating in the region – a fact that the governments has sadly been slow to exploit.
Islamic Influence Is Entrenched in Africa
by Glen Segell
University of Cambridge
Volume 12 (2024), Number 1 (January 2024)
The start of 2024 doesn’t offer much hope as it has been a difficult and turbulent 2023 for African nations faced with severe debt, global inflation, and extreme weather events. That has been execrated by domestic political turmoil fueled by Islamic inspired coups linked to great-power competition. This research paper will identify the trouble spots as a summary of 2023 to be on the agenda for conflict resolution in 2024. It will do so under the five headings: A summary of the coups; The lens of great power competition; Islamic grassroots governance; The case of South Africa; and the waning of the United Nations. The methodology is to cite from sources published in 2023. The bottom line of the findings is that there is an increase of Islamic influence in the governance of Africa.
A summary of the coups
Africa has had eight successful coups since 2020, creating a so-called junta belt from Guinea to Sudan.[1] Of these in 2023 Niger’s president, Mohamed Bazoum, was ousted on July 26 – its status is the world’s seventh-poorest country.[2] A month later, the central African nation of Gabon also experienced a coup.[3] There have been two overthrow attempts in Sierra Leone since the reelection of President Julius Maada Bio in June 2023.[4] In early December, Guinea-Bissau President Umaro Sissoco Embalo, following an attempted coup, dissolved the parliament.[5] There’s also disgruntlement in Nigeria as President Bola Tinubu was elected in February with just 37 percent of total votes.[6]
The lens of great power competition
In my opinion the first step of conflict resolution is to identify the causes and reasons for strife as a step to solutions. One view of the coups is through the lens of great power competition (GPC). I see that currently in Africa there is geopolitical competition. The argument is that Moscow and Beijing’s engagement in Africa has supported coups in the Sahel. Standing against these has been France but coupled with years of American neglect has not made a dent to counter them. Not aiding was a promised visit by President Joe Biden by the end of the year that failed to materialize. An example of why Russia is so involved is where it funnels Sudan’s gold to fund its war in Ukraine.[7]
This GPC enables a rise in Islamic governance in Africa as a result of its major impact in disrupting democracy. The vacuum of any functioning central government enables Islamic groups to control from grassroots level. This has further consequences for strife as there are violent struggles between a number of radical religious movements for example in Algeria involving Ahmadism, Salafism, Wahhabism and Takfiri ideology.[8]
Islamic grassroots governance
Great power competition is not the only cause and reason for strife in Africa in 2023 that has led to the rise of Islamic grassroots governance. Africans have turned to the local Mosques that offer a space of daily social steadiness during times of turmoil; a space once offered by the Christian Church that ultimately failed them. A case is Sudan’s war between rival generals.[9] Thrown into the cauldron of conflict is that each of these are backed in a proxy war between Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).[10]
Egypt itself has been thrown into turmoil by the Israel-Gaza war waging since Hamas attacked Israel on 7 October 2023. Egypt hosts more than 300,000 Sudanese refugees but has closed its borders to Palestinians fleeing from Gaza. Hamas emerged in 1987 during the first Palestinian uprising, or intifada as an outgrowth of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Palestinian branch. The Muslim Brotherhood has a history of plots, assassinations, and overthrows in Egypt where its President El-Sisi was elected for a third term in December 2023 but needs to trend a fine line to ensure that the Arab Spring upheavals don’t return.[11]
Whilst piracy off the eastern coast of Africa in the Indian Ocean has largely been brought under control, the impact of the Islamic based conflict in Gaza and Yemen once again threatens this maritime area and could expand landward of the seaward. For example, the Houthi movement (Ansar Allah Islamic fundamentalist) in Yemen allegedly with Iranian support are attacking shipping passing through the Bab El Mandeb straights between Africa and the Arabian Peninsula and threaten to close it.[12]
Landward of these straits and naval chokepoint sees Eritrean military bracing for a potential war as Ethiopia amassed troops near the border. The concerns center on Ethiopia’s quest to regain access to a port on the Red Sea, which it lost after Eritrea separated from Ethiopia in 1993. Yet another two African states could therefore succumb to the impact of Islamic conflicts and lead to an increase in the Islamic influence in the governance of their population.[13]
The case of South Africa
The phenomenon of treading a fine line by elected government who don’t have full control in governance is across the continent from North to South. Another case is South Africa’s insistence on hosting the summit of the BRICS nations including vocal support for Russia against Ukraine and global opinion on that war.[14]
While this may be calculated risk, South Africa also supports Hamas in its war against Israel in Gaza and is one of the few countries that recognizes it as a legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and has referred Israel for war crimes to the International Criminal Court.[15]
South Africa’s president has traveled to Egypt and Qatar offering to broker peace coupled with widespread popular support for Hamas with growing anti-Israel sentiments in parliament to break diplomatic ties with Israel.[16] Clearly in my view this is indicative of the trend in Africa of the growing rise of Islam influence in the governance of Africa continues
The waning of the United Nations
In identifying the increase of Islamic influence in the governance of Africa this research paper has also identified the causes of coups and the nature of great power competition in Africa. The three phenomena are attached in an umbilical fashion. Yet there is also a fourth phenomenon that can be identified. The tide is also turning for previous international intervention in conflict resolution, finding means to attain political stability and sustainable development.
United Nations (UN) forces for stabilization leading to sustainable development are being rejected in favor of military contractors to enforce dictatorial control.[17] A case in point is the rejection of the UN peacekeepers in Mali that will likely result in an increased reliance on the Russian based private security force, the Wagner Group.[18]
Conclusions
In sum the data, analysis and point of view of the author in this research paper is that in 2023 there has been an increase of Islamic influence in the governance of Africa and this trend is likely to continue and persist in 2024. A summary of the coups in 2023 shows that Africa has had more than any other region or continent and that the governance after them lacks conflict resolution, political stability, or sustainable development. Great power competition is on the increase on the continent that exacerbates the continual slide into desperation of mass populations. Into this void has stepped Islamic grassroots governance yet different Islamic groups vie for control using violence. Examples have been provided for all these as well as the case of South Africa and the waning of the United Nations to highlight changing patterns of support, alliances and the overall increase of Islamic influence in the governance of Africa. This Islamic influence seem to enjoy popular support from an African public fed up with staged elections, economic mismanagement, and decades of poverty.
Bibliography
[1] Yusuf, A. (2023). Resurgence of Coups and Democratic Stability in Africa: An Appraisal. Resurgence of Coups and Democratic Stability in Africa: An Appraisal (April 2, 2023).
[2] Aliyev, A. (2023). A New Battleground Between the West Alliance and Russia? In The Context of Niger. Journal of Namibian Studies: History Politics Culture, 36, 337-366.
[3] Elamin, M. O. I. (2023). Navigating Complexities: African Union’s Peace and Security Strategy Challenges after Niger and Gabon Coups. International Journal,10(3), 2070-2081.
[4] Mitton, K. (2023). Rebels of War and Peace: Street Gangs and Social Resistance in Sierra Leone. In Rebellious Riots (pp. 209-229). Brill.
[5] De Bruin, E. (2024). Power sharing and Coups d’état in postconflict settings: Evidence from Burundi and Guinea-Bissau. Armed Forces & Society, 50(1), 274-293.
[6] Alaye, A. (2023). Pitfalls in the Electoral Process of Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. African Journal of Democracy and Election Research, 4(2), 93-108.
[7] Nedele, K. C. (2023). The long arm of the state, World Peace Foundation, Fletcher School, Tufts University
[8] Malley, R. (2023). The call from Algeria: Third worldism, revolution, and the turn to Islam. Univ of California Press.
[9] Nur, B. M. (2023). Religion, Politics, and Society: The Role of Political Islam in the Sudanese Revolution of December 2018 and its Aftermath. Modern Africa: Politics, History and Society, 11(1), 11-44.
[10] Walsh, D., Koettl, C., & Schmitt, E. (2023). Talking Peace in Sudan, the UAE Secretly Fuels the Fight. International New York Times, NA-NA.
[11] Mirshak, N. (2023). The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: A Gramscian re-examination. Current Sociology, 71(3), 489-508.
[12] Mosly, A. (2023). Enhancing Cooperation on Maritime Security in the Gulf. Gulf Research Centre
[13] Weldemichael, A. T. The Peace that Led to War: Ethio-Eritrean Relations since 2018. Afriche e Orienti, Volume XXIV, Number 2
[14] Zharikov, M. V. (2023). The BRICS Mechanism as a Platform to Support Russian Interests in the Hostile Global Economic and Financial Environment. Review of Business and Economics Studies, 10(3), 6-17.
[15] Walsh, M. (2023). Hamas Allegations Threaten Another Breakdown in US-South Africa Ties. Policy Commons, 23 October 2023
[16] Bishku, M. B. (2023). South Africa’s Anti-Israel Obsession. Middle East Quarterly. Volume 30, Number 2,
[17] Udeagha, M. C., & Muchapondwa, E. (2023). Striving for the United Nations (UN) sustainable development goals (SDGs) in BRICS economies: The role of green finance, fintech, and natural resource rent. Sustainable Development.
[18] Jett, D. (2023). Why Peacekeeping Does Not Promote Peace. Middle East Policy, 30(3), 120-128.
Making Sense of the Coups in the Sahel
by Hussein Solomon
Centre for Gender and Africa Studies, University of the Free State
Volume 11 (2023), Number 6 (October 2023)
Analysts have been attempting to make sense of the spate of coups and coup attempts we have witnessed in the Sahel region. Many of these analyses focus on the vexing security situation, the dire economic circumstances of the population and the ineptitude and crass corruption of governing political elites. Whilst these explanations are useful, there may well be other more malevolent reasons for the spate of coups convulsing the region.
The security situation is dire. Over the last 5 years, terrorists have gained control of 40% of Burkina Faso’s territory leading to 2,500 closed schools and over one million people internally displaced. Economic hardship has increased. 40% of Niger’s population or 10 million citizens live in extreme poverty according to 2021 World Bank figures. According to the Human Development Index, Niger ranks amongst the lowest in the world. Climate change and its attendant desertification is serving to fuel communal conflict and religious strife, thereby increasing numbers to militant causes. Where civilian governments have failed to provide security, it is understandable when citizens place their trust in those in uniform. But, the military is a blunt instrument and rank-and-file soldiers are demoralized, nepotism and corruption are the norm in the Sahel’s armed forces, their doctrine is not fit for purpose, they are under equipped or not suitably equipped and their logistics a mess. Moreover, coups disrupt command and control structures within the armed forces. This is especially the case when junior officers overthrow their senior officers as in Burkina Faso for instance. Despite the coups, then, military juntas have been unable to thwart the Islamist juggernaut.
Polls also demonstrate that citizens in the region do not believe in democracy given their rapacious and inept political leadership. Often the will of the people is violated through electoral fraud or once the newly elected leadership enters the presidential palace and promptly ignore the plight of the people who put them in power. The social contract between rulers and the ruled is disregarded or even violated. In the process, democracy itself is debased. Before the military stepped in, in Mali, disapproval and denunciation of President Keita culminated in massive protests demanding his resignation over his handling of the terrorist threat and a series of corruption scandals. These included contested legislative elections. Ousted presidents in Guinea and Burkina Faso were subjected to ferocious criticism for various autocratic and repressive measures they enacted. These included arresting opposition figures, banning protests and curbing media freedom. In this context, the military often steps in acting as saviours of the people. Burkina Faso’s Captain Ibrahim Traore styled himself as a new Thomas Sankara with his revolutionary anti-imperialism. However, soldiers have not been schooled in the subtle and sophisticated art of governance. Consultation and compromise are the stuff of democracy, whereas the military’s top-down culture is an ill-fit for the Sahel’s fractious and fragile polities. Neither is the military schooled in irrigation, health care or entrepreneurship. As such, governance has suffered under the rule of military juntas across the region.
The reasons for the spate of coups is not only related to internal factors. We also need to reflect on the prevalence of coups in French-speaking states. French colonialism was as brutal as it was stupid, creating centralized power in deeply fragmented societies. It is not a co-incidence that the most coup-ridden countries are all Francophone. In fact, 78% of all coups in Africa since independence has been in former French colonies. There have also been too many incidents of so-called collateral damage from French counter-terrorism strikes which has further angered the populace across the Sahel. Indeed, Niger’s President Bazoum was berated because of the presence of foreign troops in Niger.
Not all foreign troops are French, of course. The US have a large drone air base in Agadez in Niger, called Niger Air Base 201. Niger Air Base 201 is Washington’s second largest miliary base in Africa after Djibouti.
What is interesting is that whilst the focus has been on French troops in Niger, and their withdrawal, there has been considerably less attention, including from the military junta regarding the American military base. Could this be because the Americans have until this past week not labelled the ouster of Barzoum as a military coup whilst President Macron openly campaigns for Barzoum to be reinstated? Moreover, the Americans via Victoria Nuland, have been engaged in a dialogue with the military junta.
Some analysts have raised concern if the French and the American military withdraw, what then are the prospects for counter-terrorism? But what has been achieved from US and French counter-terrorism over the years in the Sahel? November 2002 can be identified as the starting moment of the Global War on Terrorism in the Sahel, when the US Department of Defense (DoD) announced the launch of the Pan-Sahel Initiative, a program aiming at securing borders, tracking the movement of people, and fighting terrorism in Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Chad. France, of course, the former colonial power never left. The training of military officers over decades, the arming of Sahelian states, and joint military exercises followed. But what has been achieved in terms of counter-terrorism? Terrorist groups have proliferated across the Sahel with attacks growing ever more lethal. To put matters into perspective, in 2016 there were 76 violent events linked to Islamist militant groups in the Sahel but this jumped to 2800 for 2022 – a 3,600 percent increase. This, despite the fact that the US poured in more than a billion dollars of security assistance to Sahel states for more than 20 years!
The coup in Niger highlighted the major problem of counter-terrorism efforts over these past two decades – with its over-emphasis on the military. Niger has a long history of coups and coup attempts – with the July coup being the fifth “successful” coup in the country since independence in 1960. In this context, was it smart to train and equip such a military and to use the military as one’s primary counter-terrorism instrument? Writing in Rolling Stone, Nick Turse wrote a hard-hitting article entitled “How Many More Governments will American-trained Soldiers’ Overthrow?” He points out that Lt. Col Paul-Henri Damiba who overthrew a civilian government in Burkina Faso was trained by the US over many years. This included an annual US special operations program (Flintlock), an US State Department Africa Contingency Training and Assistance course, the US-sponsored Military Intelligence Basic Officer Course and a Civil-Military Support Element. In fact, according to Turse, US -trained military officers were involved in seven coups in Sahel countries – three in Burkina Faso, three in Mali and one in Mauritania. Clearly these graduates of US largesse got a fail for civil-military relations. The current leader of Mali, Colonel Assimi Goita who participated in two Operation Flintlock exercises, worked with US Special Forces for several years and staged two coups in Mali in 2020 and 2021. Of course, these coups by US trained officers are not a new phenomenon. In 2012, Captain Amadou Sanogo who was trained in Texas, Georgia and Arizona in courses ranging from being an infantry officer to military intelligence, returned to his native Mali where he promptly staged a coup. Following the coup, he proudly declared: “America is a great country with a fantastic army. I tried to put all the things I learned there into practice here”.
What accounts for this colossal failure on the part of the US? According to Donovan Chau, the answer seems to be ignorance – ignorance of local cultures, ignorance of the state in the African context, ignorance of history and ignorance of African militaries.
So, could ignorance account for the US to keep making the mistake of training Africa’s officers who have this propensity to stage coups in their country? I have interacted with the American military over several years and can assure you that these are not ignorant people. They tend to be amongst the brightest people I have met. Moreover, the US military is quick to learn lessons from past experiences. Consider, too, that it is not only the Sahel where US-trained military officers have staged coups. Nick Turse reminds us of the likes of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, Pakistans’ Mohammed Zial ul-Haq, Romeo Vasques of Honduras and Philippe Biamby of Haiti.
So, if not ignorance what could account for this apparent failure on the part of the US? Perhaps the 2015 US Geological Survey has an answer. The Taoudeni Basin which runs across Mali and Mauritania happens to possess: 160 million barrels of conventional oil, 1880 billion cubic feet of conventional gas, 602 million barrels of shale oil, and 6395 billion feet of shale gas.
Terrorism in the Sahel following the coup in Niger
by Hussein Solomon
Centre for Gender and Africa Studies, University of the Free State
Volume 11 (2023), Number 5 (August 2023)
Terrorism in the Sahel accounts for 43% of global terrorism deaths. In purely geographic terms the Sahel, or Sahil in Arabic, meaning coast or shore, is a vast region that stretches along the Sahara Desert from the Atlantic to the Red Sea. In recent years, when policy makers have referred to the Sahel they were referring to a far narrower band of countries – Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad. However, recent developments may well suggest we approach the notion of the Sahel in the more expansive sense – from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea.
This more expansive reading relates to recent ominous events which suggests that the sources of insecurity are so intertwined across different countries, a regional security complex has emerged which includes state fragility, poor civil-military relations, ethnic conflict, narco-trafficking, human smuggling, and terrorism. Over the past year Islamist insurgents have grown more sophisticated in their attacks – making use of drones, for instance. The growth of the Islamist threat also relates to poor counter-terrorism policy. Consider how disjointed the counter-terrorism response has been where the military, economic and governance dimensions of counter-terrorism do not speak to each other. Then there are the countless own goals on the part of the region’s states as well as the international community. The withdrawal of Mali from the Sahel G-5 which is effectively G-4 as well as the ending of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has needlessly surrendered more territory to terrorists. Given the civil war in Sudan and the coup in Niger – this arc of instability from coast to coast has been reinforced.
The civil war in Sudan, and the negative impact it is having on neighbouring states, could well see the growth of Islamist militancy across the Sahel – literally from the Atlantic to the Red Sea. Militants thrive where power vacuums exist – the so-called ungoverned spaces. In the case of Sudan, the two strongest forces in the country historically have been the Islamists and the military. Neither is positive for the future trajectory of the country. With the widespread revulsion of the military, there is a danger here that society could once more embrace more radical versions of Islam as they desperately seek a reprieve from the enveloping chaos and violence.
In the case of Cameroon, the conflict between the Anglophone and Francophone parts is in its sixth year. Increasingly Cameroon is beginning to resemble Sudan in some respects and the conflict trajectory is set to escalate. This is clearly evident in the increase in terrorist activities inside Cameroon.
Coastal states in West Africa like Ghana and Senegal are now for the first time vulnerable to the spread of Islamists. For a long time, Senegal remained an oasis of peace in the volatile region. Given the current political turmoil in the country, Islamists may well exploit this and piggy-back on local grievances to spread their pernicious ideology as they have done so elsewhere.
Then there is Niger. The coup of 26th July 2023 which witnessed the toppling of President Mohamed Barzoum by General Abdourahman Tchiani. The military junta asserted that the coup would allow them an opportunity to pursue counter-terrorism more vigorously. This was the same reason proffered by the military juntas in Burkina Faso and Mali when the captured power. However, terror attacks actually increased in both Burkina Faso and Mali following the men in uniform now capturing the presidential palaces of Ouagadougou and Bamako. I fear that the same will be the case in Niger.
For some years, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara and Boko Haram have been operating on the territory of Niger. Following this latest coup, terror attacks have escalated with terrorists making use of the turmoil to spread their malign influence. On the 9th August 2023, 5 soldiers were killed in an ambush in the western town of Sanam. A mere 4 days later, on 13th August, another 6 soldiers were killed in Sanam by militants on motorbikes in an ambush. There has been no response from Niamey to these brazen attacks on their soldiers.
Niger’s Islamist militancy challenges have severe implications for the rest of the region as the country is strategically located between two terrorist hotbeds – the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin. Moreover, when Bamako ended all defence accords with Paris on 2 May 2022, French forces relocated to Niger. The generals in control of Niamey now want all French troops out. This will have grave implications for the fight against terrorism in the region. Meanwhile, in Niger’s Agadez, Washington operates a large drone air base – Niger Air Base 201. If the Americans are also forced to abandon this air base, counter-terrorism efforts will suffer another blow.
The clouds of war hang heavily over the barren landscape of the Sahel from coast to coast.
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South Africa’s Greylisting and Terrorist Financing
by Hussein Solomon
Centre for Gender and Africa Studies, University of the Free State
Volume 11 (2023), Number 3 (March 2023)
At its plenary in February 2023 the global financial crimes watchdog – the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) – officially greylisted South Africa for not being in full compliance of international standards preventing terrorist financing and money laundering. The market reaction was swift with the South African Rand falling to R18.42 to the US dollar on the day of the announcement. In an effort to prevent the listing, the South African government attempted to push through legislation – the General Laws Amendment Act and the Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorism and Related Activities Amendment Act – to tighten up our financial controls. However, as the FATF noted, the real issue in the country is less the laws and more the execution and non-implementation of existing legislation. President Cyril Ramaphosa attempted to put a brave force on the country’s greylisting – arguing that it is an opportunity to fight financial crimes. However, such a spin is a difficult sell where the President himself still has to account for hundreds of thousands of dollars stuffed into his couches and where the ruling African National Congress (ANC) is so deeply intertwined with corruption. To put it simply, the government lacks credibility. Credibility is the first casualty when the gap between promise and performance grows ever wider. Words, and little to no action, has been the norm of the Ramaphosa administration.
In many ways, this was inevitable as the problem of terrorist financing is a long-standing one. Despite repeated warnings from the FATF, of which South Africa is a member, Pretoria has done little to stop this country from becoming a rear base for terrorist groups globally. For decades, South Africa has turned a blind eye to terrorists using the country as a safe house, securing identity documents from corrupt Home Affairs individuals, engaging in paramilitary activities and raising funds for their terrorist activities. As early as 2009, the FATF warned that the country needs to pay closer attention to regulating trusts, monitoring financial transactions, compliance with anti-money laundering legislation, and enhancing the disclosure of trans-border cash transfers. In October 2021, the FATF stated that South Africa had a strong legal framework against money laundering and terrorism financing. However, it warned that its implementation had significant shortcomings, including a failure to prosecute criminal cases. These failures were to result in the country’s greylisting on 24th February 2023.
It was only right for the FATF to focus on terrorist financing. Money is the oxygen that no terrorist movement can do without. One needs finances to pay one’s recruits. One needs cash to mount a surveillance operation, procure weapons, pay for safe houses, or acquire identification documents and pay to move one’s operatives about. For the past twenty years, terrorist financing has been a problem for South Africa. There was the case of Yasin al Qadi, a US designated terrorist financier who invested US $3 million for a 12 percent stake in global Diamond Resources that mined diamonds in South Africa. He also controlled New Diamond Corporation, an offshore company that had mining interests in South Africa.
The case of Abd al-Muhsin al-Libi, also known as Ibrahim Tantouche, also points to how terrorists secure financing in South Africa. He set up two Al Qaeda financing fronts – the Afghan Support Committee and the Revival of Islamic Society. Both operated as charities that raised money for orphans. In reality, however, the orphans were either dead or non-existent. Other funding fronts were also established. Hezbollah established the Karbala Liberation Front in Johannesburg, which sent money to Hezbollah in Lebanon to fund terror operations. In 1992, the same year in which Hamas became active in South Africa, the Al-Aqsa International Foundation (AIF) was established in the country. According to Ronald Sandee, Hamas’s political wing is in control of its office in Fordsburg, Johannesburg. By 2010, the Al Aqsa International Foundation found its way on the list of US designated terror organisations and fronts. These cases reinforce what the FATF has warned about in its October 2021 evaluation – the abuse of not-for-profit organizations or charities. The FATF also appealed to South Africa to enhance its oversight of these charities and NGOs.
In January 2007 the issue of terrorist financing emerged again in South Africa when it was reported that two South African cousins – Farhad Ahmed Dockrat, the principal of the Darus Salaam Islamic College in Laudium, Pretoria and Dr. Junaid Ismail Dockrat – were proposed for consideration on the UN Security Council’s list of terror suspects, whilst already having been placed on the US Treasury Department’s list of Al Qaeda supporters. According to papers submitted to the UNSC, Farhad is alleged to be an Al Qaeda “facilitator and terrorist financier” who gave R400,000 to the Taliban ambassador in Pakistan. Farhad Dockrat, who was previously detained in Gambia for suspected terrorist activities in 2005, was also alleged to have provided US$ 63,000 to the Al Akhtar Trust. This was a “charity” that was designated as having provided support to Al
Qaeda. Junaid, it is claimed is also an Al Qaeda “financier, recruiter and facilitator” who assisted in coordinating the travel of South Africans to Pakistan to train with Al Qaeda. Junaid Dockrat, it is alleged, raised US$ 120,000 for Hazma Rabia, the former Al
Qaeda chief of operations.
Fast forward to July 2022 and the problem of terrorism financing came to the fore when the United Nations Security Council expressed grave concern at how Islamic State’s tentacles were spreading across the African continent and how South Africa is being used to fund Islamic State affiliates. In November 2022, the US Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on the associates and companies of Farhad Hoomer whom they allege to be a South African leader of an Islamic State cell. According to the US, this IS cell located in Durban was largely used to raise funds for IS operatives in the Congo and Mozambique. Alarm bells should be ringing for South Africa’s security establishment since the country’s troops are part of a regional mission to thwart the Islamist insurgency in northern Mozambique whilst at least 7 South African nationals are known to be a part of the insurgency although the real figure is suspected to be around 40.
Perhaps more to the point was how the more than a million South African rands were raised for Islamic State in South Africa. It seems this was largely done through kidnapping-for-ransom operations and extorting major businesses. This suggests the proximity between terrorist groups and organized crime in South Africa. Members of this same cell were arrested for the fatal attack on the Shia Imam Hussain Mosque in Verulam. In this horrific attack, incendiary devices were planted near the mosque, worshippers were stabbed and one’s throat was fatally slit. This suggests that terror groups in South Africa may not be satisfied with just being a rear base providing funding to other IS franchises in Africa but are increasingly becoming operational – prepared to engage in terror attacks on home soil.
Hoomer was arrested again when he together with his accomplices were found in possession of handguns, an AK-47, a bolt action rifle with a scope, thousands of rounds of ammunition and a cellphone jammer. The case was eventually dropped by the state since the police failed to secure search warrants when they raided the Mayville warehouse where these weapons and munitions were found. No wonder that the FATF’s 2021 Mutual Evaluation Report noted that the country has failed to effectively identify, investigate or prosecute terrorist financiers. In fact, the FATF observed that South Africa has only ever convicted one person involved in terrorism financing – this despite the fact that it has been going on for decades. In fact, terrorism cases are routinely dropped by the state or thrown out by magistrates. In the case of the attack on the Shia mosque, the magistrate berated the prosecution for “unreasonable delays”.
The inability to prosecute points to a fundamental truism that state institutions have been hollowed out – they lack good people because of years of cadre deployment. Moreover, state security institutions have been politicized and have criminal elements lurking within their ranks as recent revelations have illustrated pertaining to Crime Intelligence within the South African Police Services. A recent report by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) gives us some insight into the scale of the challenge confronted:
“Investigators with close knowledge of Islamic State-linked groups told GI-TOC that South African authorities do not currently have enough technical and specialist capacity to deal with cases of this nature. An officer in the Hawks unit for Crimes Against the State expressed concerns that the unit is “seriously understaffed”, with only around 20 officers with the requisite knowledge and experience nationwide. Several sources told GI-TOC that there is a single South African Police Service expert who analyses data seized in terror raids. The Verulam mosque attack investigation – in which Hoomer was charged – alone yielded five terabytes of data for analysis from 200 separate devices seized from the accused, creating an insurmountable task for the personnel available”.
Under the circumstances, it is understandable why South Africa is unable to prosecute terrorism cases and why the country has been greylisted. Greylisting has a deleterious impact on an already struggling economy – the cost of doing business has become more expensive and ultimately hard-pressed consumers have to pick up the tab. Some have suggested that if Pretoria follows the FATF prescriptions, the country could be taken off the greylist by 2025. In my view this is rather hopeful. South Africa is a country that is unable to keep the lights on, fill a pothole, get drinking water to its citizens or have a functioning post office which can deliver a letter. Why then are people confident that this government can get South Africa off the greylist when its own monumental incompetence got us into this situation in the first place?
Israel and the African Union: A South African Perspective
by Hussein Solomon
Centre for Gender and Africa Studies, University of the Free State
Volume 11 (2023), Number 2 (February 2023)
What exactly happened at the AU Summit on Saturday, 18 February when Israel’s Foreign Ministry’s Deputy Director-General, Sharon Bar-li, was forcefully ejected from the Summit? Video footage showed her surrounded by AU security and escorted out of the AU Assembly Hall. According to the Israeli Foreign Ministry, Bar-li had valid accreditation as an observer and an entry tag. However, Ebba Kalondo, spokesperson for the AU Commission stated that the senior Israeli diplomat was expelled from the Summit since she was never personally invited and that she had used a non-transferable invitation issued to Aleli Admasu who was Israel’s ambassador to the African Union.
Another, possibly conflicting message, from AU Commission Chair Moussa Faki Mahamat soon appeared claiming that Israel was never invited to the Summit as deliberations on its observer status is still ongoing. As such, Israel’s observer status was suspended until such time as the AU committee deliberating on Israel’s observer status agrees to it. Israel’s foreign ministry is adamant that there is no legal basis for the cancellation of Israel’s observer status to the continental body as there is a clear majority of member states in favor of Israel’s admission. Israel has a point. 46 African countries already enjoy diplomatic relations with Israel. There are indications that the relationship between Israel and Africa is strengthening. Earlier this this year, Chad’s president – Mahamat Idriss Deby Ito – opened his country’s embassy in Ramat Gan, outside Tel Aviv. Chad is a Muslim majority country and Prime Minister Netanyahu was also in attendance and characterized the occasion as “historic”.
This latter point is of importance as it has prompted speculation as to the real reasons for the unceremonious ejection of the Israeli delegation from the Summit as well as the possible withdrawal of its observer status. Some have suggested that AU Chair Moussa Faki who was Chad’s former foreign minister and a political rival of President Ito was attempting to embarrass the President by suspending Israel’s observer status. On the other hand, Thembisa Fakude, Director at Africa-Asia Dialogues, laid the blame for the diplomatic debacle at the door of Faki Mahamat because he alleged that he tried to include the Israeli delegation “through the back door, and the plan backfired”.
Israel, meanwhile, blamed Algeria and South Africa for being behind the attempts to eject the country from the pan African organization. This is plausible. South Africa together with Algeria has been lobbying hard against the decision to grant Israel observer status to the AU since 2021. Solidarity with the Palestinian people has been one of the cornerstones of South African foreign policy. Certainly, the African National Congress (ANC) government in Pretoria could not hide its glee at the ejection of the Israeli delegation from the Summit. The ANC, in a statement, welcomed the “encouraging expulsion” of the senior Israeli diplomat. The Israeli foreign ministry hinted at dark consequences for Pretoria’s stance noting that it intends to look harshly upon the incident and that it would summon South Africa’s charge d’ affaires for an official reprimand. South Africa, it appears, is going out of its way to antagonize key allies and investment partners at a time when its moribund economy desperately needs the injection of foreign capital. The naval drill its currently hosting with Russia and China off Durban has added to further tensions with Washington and later this week there is a strong likelihood that South Africa would be grey listed by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). This is an international watchdog whose aim is the prevention of money laundering and financing terrorism through the enforcement of certain international standards.
Pretoria’s obsession with Israel is puzzling. If concerned, about human rights abuses against Palestinians by Israel, why not object to North Korea’s observer status at the AU. For that matter, why not raise concerns over Zimbabwe’s human rights track record or the excesses of Swaziland’s despotic monarch King Mswati III. Pretoria also attempted to shield Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir from the International Criminal Court to answer for atrocities in Darfur. Attempting to isolate Israel will not work – it has been tried before and failed. A critical engagement with Israel is needed – one which seeks to strengthen the hands of moderates on both sides in Israel-Palestine. This would mean strengthening the Palestinian Authority and not Hamas and Islamic Jihad. It would attempt to also strengthen secular, centrist and leftist forces within Israeli politics and society. This, in turn, calls for a sophisticated foreign policy on the part of Pretoria. However, the country’s diplomatic corps as a whole display neither the intellectual depth nor the finesse needed to conduct such a sophisticated foreign policy. Indeed, it, like the ANC, appears to be operating along ideological lines as opposed to any conception of the national interest. The 46 African countries which enjoy diplomatic relations with Israel adopt a more pragmatic, as opposed to ideological, approach to its relations with Israel seeking its investments and expertise in diverse areas from agriculture to tech start ups. Even in South Africa itself, Israeli water and solar power technology translates into fresh food for 3.5 million South Africans.
South Africa is facing a serious calamity. Electricity outages are costing the country R900 million per day. The state’s debt burden is almost R5 trillion rand and its debt servicing costs is the fastest growing expenditure line item in the budget. Foreign investors, meanwhile, are dumping South African bonds. In February alone, R31 billion was dumped. The social fabric is fraying, and violent crime is at its worst levels. In the third quarter of 2022, there were 7,555 recorded murders – a 10 percent year on year increase. The legitimacy of this corrupt-riddled government is in serious question with some opinion polls suggesting that the ANC might well secure less than 40 percent of the vote in next year’s elections. There are 8,614 km separating Pretoria and Jerusalem. Given the enormity of the challenges South Africa faces on the home front, the ANC’s obsession with Israel is mind-boggling. Now is the time to seek international partners to build this country – not antagonize them.
Ethiopia at Threat: The “Islamic State” Insurgent Movement Reaches Out to Amharic Speakers
by Glen Segell
Volume 11 (2023), Number 1 (January 2023)
© Copyright Glen Segell 2023
Introduction
The Islamic State also known as Daesh and frequently abbreviated as ISIS has become a global movement [1]. It is evident on all continents and like Sunni Al–Qaeda or Shia Hezbollah, it has also reared its head in Africa. It is actively raging insurgencies from the Mali region in West Africa across to its origins in Iraq/Syria.
ISIS like Al–Qaeda is a grassroots bottom-up franchise without direct control unlike Hezbollah that is a top-down movement orchestrated by Tehran. This doesn’t distract from modus operandi where all three movements have local and dispersed militant forces that are supported by a worldwide constellation of pro-social media outlets by individual sympathizers who help shape, amplify, and disseminate narratives to support the greater cause.
Being global movements has its advantages but also its challenges. For example the causes of all three movements rests on Islam so the social media apparatus produces its propaganda in Arabic. However the further afield from the Middle East they seek to build and maintain support poses the challenge of a vast target audience comprised of speakers of many different languages. For example in Africa, the locals speak hundreds of languages as well as some having a second language of English, French or Portuguese resonating from the European colonial era.[2]
The Reach Out to Amharic Speakers
Islamic Fundamentalism including the ISIS exists in the Horn of Africa and that is mainly Somalia, Eritrea, and Ethiopia.[3] ISIS first become overtly evident as being active there in 2015. Its origins are Abdul Qadir Mu’min, a veteran jihadist leader and former senior cleric for the Al-Qaeda branch in Somalia known as Al-Shabaab. He broke away from the group and subsequently pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and ISIS in October 2015. The ISIS leadership in Iraq/Syria recognized this East Africa Cell as an official province of the “Islamic State Caliphate” in December 2017.[4]
Immediately there were signs of ISIS’s intention to increase support locally and in late December 2017 an ISIS-Somalia short 2 minute video featured a jihadist from Ethiopia speaking the Amharic language.[5] By July 2019, pro-ISIS social media world-wide had content in Amharic. There may well be over 25 million people who speak the language; they are mostly located in the Horn of Africa with smaller diaspora communities scattered globally.[6]
Yet it was in the last half of 2022 that this propaganda intensified. The Somalia ISIS Cell released a significant media production featuring the use of the Amharic language. Its content was the first explicit and meaningful gesture from the local ISIS directly acknowledging Amharic speakers’ contribution to the movement.[7]
The 26-minute-long video, “In the footsteps of the conquerors”, is in Amharic with Arabic subtitles. The video is shot in high quality and shows operations, training, and the daily life of its fighters, featuring Ethiopians among its ranks. The video shows Ethiopian recruits training and taking courses in absolute monotheism (tawhid), jurisprudence (fiqh), and the laws of government (Siyyasa al-Shar’iyya).[8]
It would be prudent to assume that this is a deliberate appeal to Ethiopians, Somalians, and Eritreans who speak the Amharic language to join the ISIS cause and be more active and proactive. This is a clear indication that ISIS is seeking an opportunity for increasing recruitment, fundraising, and building support in the Amharic speaking world.
The Amharic Propaganda Sphere
Following the 26-minute-long video, over the last six months of 2022, a sizable pro-ISIS Amharic media and communications ecosystem has emerged. By December 2022 it consisted of Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, WhatsApp, Telegram and Twitter networks comprised of several key propaganda production modes, leading ideologues, and interactive discussion channels. The same messages in Amharic are also evident on websites and online archives.
The messages are amplified by local and regional radio stations that also broadcast over the Internet such as the Voice of Munasir Radio, Fatwa Media, and Fatwa Amharic. The Voice of Munasir Radio is the most active among these and is perhaps the most significant media force in Amharic Cyber Space. The group releases audio content in Amharic and Arabic dealing with theological and religious topics, jurisprudence, weekly news, explanations, and historical events. Sermons, videos, posters, and translated ISIS materials are very evident.
Less prominent is Fatwa Media because it is mainly on Telegram and because it deals on heavier religious and ideological issues. Fatwa Amharic concentrates on translating globally available ISIS material from Arabic to Amharic which is then shared throughout its networks and across platforms.
With the Internet being a two-way street of communication, the notable component of any online pro-ISIS Amharic networks is the growing web of interactive channels where supporters, ISIS members, ideologues and leaders discuss current affairs, religious topics, ISIS-related insurgencies around the world, and ultimately contribute to the movement’s cause through discourse development and personal input.
A notable feature of the significance of this ISIS-related material in Amharic was the decision of the I’lam Foundation to archive as much as possible. The I’lam – Arab Center for Media Freedom, Development and Research was founded in 2000 by a group of Palestinian intellectuals and journalists active in the fields of civil society, media, and research.
The Future and Threats to Ethiopia
Sunni ISIS like Sunni Al–Qaeda or Shia Hezbollah is always looking to expand its reach and tap into new pools of potential supporters. The growing Amharic networks are indicative of a burgeoning competition in the online ecosystem for supporters for these movements.
This has real-world impact and may pose some level of threat to Ethiopia where most Amharic speakers live. The consequences and the future because of such cyber competition may well see a physical confrontation. There may be a move from the cyber sphere to the Street. Amharic speaking Ethiopia may be the new battlefield between Sunni and Shia insurgent movements.
The central, regional, and local levels of government of Ethiopia are aware of this threat as their governance is a primary target for such insurgent movements. Addis Ababa has released statements detailing a series of raids and disrupted plots involving ISIS members in the country. For example in 2017, 26 suspected jihadists were arrested in an operation against an Ethiopian ISIS network. By the end of July 2018, ISIS had claimed responsibility for around 65 attacks in Somalia and the region.[9] In 2019, the Ethiopian army captured ISIS militants, and, in 2021, authorities claimed they busted a cell going by the name “Islamic State Center”.[10]
If the trend continues and if ISIS intensifies its Amharic language propaganda efforts, then Ethiopia and indeed the rest of the Horn of Africa and East Africa will be at threat. As the pattern has evidenced in the Middle East from such a trend of Cyber Islamic Fundamentalism then ISIS will increase its efforts to appeal for recruitment, fundraising, and encouraging violent attacks.
There is a clear and present risk of elements within the thriving Amharic online ecosystem to answer such calls to physical violence. This will lead both to competition and conflict with other insurgent movements and a rise in anti-government activities and confrontations. The victim as always will be the man in the Street; most of the population who are innocent bystanders not wishing such propaganda or violence.
References
[1] Daniel Byman, Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Global Jihadist Movement, Oxford University Press, 2021
[2] W. E. Welmers, African Language Structures, University of California Press, 2018
[3] Meysam Mirzaei Tabar, “Geopolitics and the Roots of Islamic Fundamentalism,” Geopolitics Quarterly, Volume: 17, No 4, Winter 2022, 53-74
[4] Anthony Tucker-Jones, Daesh: Islamic State’s Holy War, Pen & Sword Military, 2018
[5] Data gathered by the Author during Research
[6] Language Learning – Amharic, https://library.bu.edu/amharic
[7] Data gathered by the Author during Research
[8] For example and made available by ISIS on Facebook but removed by Facebook at https://www.facebook.com/ethioandenetcome/photos/a.116288213437547/229231815476519/?type=3
[9] European Institute of Peace, The Islamic State in East Africa, September 2018, https://www.eip.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Report_IS-in-East-Africa_October-2018-3.pdf
[10] “Islamic State Centre” extremist groups arrested in Bale,” Borkena, 31 January 2021
“Islamic State Centre” extremist groups arrested in Bale
Glen Segell (DPhil, FRGS) is Professor at the University of Cambridge, and Visiting Professor and Research Fellow in the Department of Political Studies and Governance at the University of the Free State, South Africa. He is also Research Fellow at the Ezri Center for Iran & Gulf Studies, University of Haifa, Israel, and Editor of The Middle East Tracker and The London Security Policy Study. He serves as an Executive Advisory Board Member of the International Political Studies Association Research Committee on Armed Forces and Society. He holds the rank of Brigadier-General (Reserves) and is an expert for NATO STO.
Analyzing terrorism in Africa: Pitfalls and Context
by Hussein Solomon
Volume 10 (2022), Number 9 (November 2022)
This past week, I found myself making an input for counter-terrorism analysts of the African Union. It was hosted by the Algiers-based African Centre of the Study and Research on Terrorism which is a key structure of the African Union in the fight against terrorism on the continent. What follows is my presentation to this august body on analyzing and contextualizing terrorism in the African context.
When former US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld was asked in February 2002 that Saddam Hussein was supplying weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups, he responded, “There are known knowns — there are things we know we know,” We also know there are known unknowns — that is to say, we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns, the ones we don’t know we don’t know.”
I reflected on Rumsfeld’s quote on 26th October 2022 when the US Embassy in Pretoria issued a “terrorist attack alert” warning of an imminent attack in Sandton, South Africa. Amongst the alleged targets was a Gay Pride Parade and a performance by a Jewish comedian. The Australian, Canadian and UK High Commissions soon followed the American example – issuing terror alerts of their own. The South African government was incensed since they claimed that the Americans never consulted with them. Subsequently it emerged that the South Africans had met with the CIA. Pretoria also claimed that its intelligence services which is constantly monitoring threats were unaware of any threat posed to the gatherings taking place in Sandton. However, there were subsequent media reports where anonymous South African intelligence sources complained that a threat had surfaced and because the Americans made the announcement prematurely, 6 months of intelligence work was blown apart. So, was there a terror threat or not? To make matters worse, various South African analysts claimed that the terror alert had nothing to do with the threat of terrorism and more an attempt by Washington to pressurize South Africa to leave the BRICS alliance.
In this situation of claims vs counter-claims, it is difficult for the analyst to come to know which of the claims is an accurate depiction of reality. Analysis of terrorism is difficult. Why? Because officials lie, states lie and terrorist groups lie. States, for instance, either understate or overstate the magnitude of terrorism in their countries for their own reasons. Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni, for instance, attempted to accentuate the linkages between Al Qaeda and domestic terror groups like the West Nile Bank Front and the Lord’s Resistance Army with a view to soliciting international support. Other countries have made use of anti-terror legislation to crush legitimate dissent as they seek to thwart the democratic aspirations of their people whilst tenaciously hanging onto power.
Worse, these countries feed tainted information to the AU on what is supposedly going on in their countries. Of course, if the AU formulates policies on this tainted information and acts on it, failure is inevitable. States, of course, are not alone in this. Terror groups often claim responsibility for a successful terror attack committed by other groups to enhance their stature. This is especially true given the rivalry between the various Al Qaeda and Islamic State franchises across Africa.
The key here is to approach all data with a cynical attitude and to have multiple data points when analyzing terrorist acts or groups. Trust nothing you see. Question everything, keep an emotional distance from your subject matter, be aware of your own bias, try to rise above the fact that you hail from a certain country, or that you are an adherent of a particular religious faith. Perhaps, most difficult of all, maintain your independent analysis even if your superiors expect another outcome in your analysis.
On this point, let me make a recommendation to you. I have been working on issues of terrorism for the past 30 years. Some time back a senior general brought me in to assist with analysis of data coming in from the field. I was surprised since I knew the general had several analysts on his team. When I asked him about it, he smiled and said it is to prevent “group think”. I think the AU could consider a team of vetted academics who look at the data and possibly give alternative analyses. Colleagues, let us be frank we are failing 1.2 billion Africans in providing security. If you look at the Global Terrorism Index, whilst terrorist incidents are decreasing elsewhere, they are increasing on the African continent. Terror groups are proliferating, attacks are becoming more lethal and more sophisticated. It is time to acknowledge that our current approaches are flawed.
Perhaps, more than analyzing the information presented to you, is to look for the information not there. These omissions can only be identified by having analysts who have specialized in their subject. I was once asked to give advice to a security agency and I quickly discovered that there were musical chairs being played with an analyst working the North Africa desk today, the Horn of Africa desk a few months later and so on. At this agency, some analysts did not even speak the local language at the desk they were responsible for. This is a recipe for disaster.
In concrete terms, what do I mean by omissions? I once attended a workshop consisting of senior security officials from across the continent where counter-terrorism was discussed. At no point was the growing criminalization of the African state discussed and the terrorists’ exploitation of this. In Somalia, meanwhile, arms meant for the Somali National Army have miraculously found their way into the hands of Al Shabaab fighters. In Nigeria, former President Goodluck Jonathan bemoaned the fact that Boko Haram has penetrated the security forces and the political apparatus of state.
A key issue of analysis is asking the right questions. Again, this can only happen if the analysts are specialists. Consider doing an analysis on Al Shabaab and not asking why 70% of its fighters emanates from the Rahanweyn-Digil clans?
Effective analysis in my view is not trapped in the moment. It understands the larger socio-political, economic and historic context of current developments. When considering Tuareg recruitment into militant groups, economic context is important. It matters that the average poverty rate in Mali is 64% whilst it is much higher in northern Mali. Timbuktu has a poverty rate of 77%. For Gao, the figure is 78.7% and for Kidal a staggering 92%. Small wonder that when Ansar Dine first started, they demanded an end to poverty and for dignity to be restored to every citizen in northern Mali through economic development. The involvement of Tuaregs in various Islamist groupings should also be contextualized in historical terms considering their rebellions between 1963-64, 1990-1996, 2006-09 and since January 2012. This is important since the Global Terrorism Index makes clear the intimate relationship between the emergence of terrorism and countries already experiencing conflict. 96% of all terrorism related deaths occurred in countries already experiencing other forms of conflict.
True analysis has to steer away from adopting simplistic stereotypes such as an Islamic fundamentalism vs liberal democratic politics as one French security official told me. There is a complexity regarding identity politics in Africa. Consider here the case of the 4,000 strong Macina Liberation Front (MLF) which instrumentalizes the Islamic faith for reasons of ethnocentric nationalism. This is an ethnic Fulani (also called Peul) movement that seeks to revive the 19th century Macina Empire. There are 20 million Fulani spread across the Sahel and the MLF recruits from among them. The same could be said of the Kanuri-dominated Boko Haram which recruits not only from the 7 million Kanuri in Nigeria, but also from among the 1,1 million Kanuri in Chad, the 850,000 in Niger and the 56,000 Kanuri in Cameroon. In an effort to broaden its appeal, Boko Haram has also reached out to Hausa-Fulani peoples across the region, but the upper echelons of the movement remain Kanuri-dominated.
Finally, nothing exists in a vacuum. We are all shaped by our histories and this is clearly evident in the case of West Africa and the Sahel. Much of mainstream accounts ignore the historical roots of jihad in this volatile region. Consider for instance the jihad embarked upon in the Senegal River Valley in 1673 as well as the jihadi roots of the Fulani uprisings starting in Futa Jallon in 1725 and ending in Macina in 1818. The formation of the Toucouleur Empire of El Hadj Umar Tall from 1856 to 1861 also had its basis in jihad. The most impressive of these jihads was undoubtedly that of Fulani scholar, Uthman dan Fodio, which began in 1804 and established a caliphate that endured until the arrival of the British in 1903. This brief historical overview is important for two reasons. First, the fact that historically jihad has emerged from within these societies suggest that it is not something alien to these societies and not necessarily an import from the Middle East. Moreover, latter day jihadis in the form of Boko Haram look for inspiration from Uthman dan Fodio’s jihad in the 19th century and deliberately seek to emulate his campaign in their struggle against Abuja.
I started this presentation with a quote from former US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, allow me to end this presentation with a quote from my favorite author, Salman Rushdie, who wrote: “The only people who see the whole picture are the ones who step outside the frame.” As analysts, I appeal to you to step outside the frame.
Research on Islam and Muslims in Africa 