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The Post-9/11 Strategic Challenge of Somalia’s al Shabab – Ruan van der Walt and Hussein Solomon

April 14, 2013

topBanner_isl_mus_afrThe Post-9/11 Strategic Challenge of Somalia’s al Shabab

By Ruan van der Walt[1] and Hussein Solomon

RIMA Occasional Papers, Volume 1 (2013), Number 9 (April 2013)

Somalia is often cited as the paradigm of a weak state.[2]  Somalia, the number-seven-shaped country that forms the Horn of Africa in the north-east of the continent, has long been a contested concept, even amongst Somalis, embodying one of postcolonial Africa’s worst mismatches between conventional state structures and indigenous customs and institutions.[3]  During the nineteenth century, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Ethiopia laid claim on the Somali-inhabited territories in the Horn of Africa and divided the “Greater Somalia” into five distinct political jurisdictions.[4]  Decades of civil war resulted in state collapse and weak institutions, providing the ideal environment for terrorism, and especially the rise of radical Islam, in Somalia. 

The myth of ‘Somalia’

One might assume that the Somalis possess an excellent basis for a cohesive polity, given the fact that Somalis share a common ethnicity, culture, language and religion, but in reality Somalis are divided by territorial borders and clan affiliations – the most important component of their identity.[5]  The unification of the former British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland following independence on 1 July 1960 to form the Republic of Somalia still excluded Somali brethren from neighbouring territories – in what is today Djibouti, eastern Ethiopia and northern Kenya.[6]  Somalia’s current strife began in 1969 when Muhammad Siad Barre overthrew elected president Abdirashid Ali Shermarke in a military coup.[7]  Somalia has been characterised by bouts of civil and international war since then, resulting in profound instability that still persists today. 

Somalia’s political and economic development stagnated under the authoritarian socialist regime of Muhammad Siad Barre, characterised by persecution, jailing and torture of political opponents and dissidents, with the president inordinately favouring members of his own Darod clan-family over others.[8]  Barre’s unsuccessful attempt to conquer Ethiopia’s Somali-inhabited region, the Ogaden, in 1977 led to a national crisis, which eventually contributed to internal dissent and civil war.  Barre’s regime collapsed in 1991 and the country fell further into a state of disarray and violent clan-militia warfare. 

The Somali population – some thirteen to fourteen million, including Somalis living in neighbouring states[9] – is divided into four major clans and a number of minority groups.[10]  Similar to tribal societies elsewhere in the Middle East, the clans use deeply ingrained customary law to independently govern their communities from modern state structures.  There have been over a dozen Somali national reconciliation peace agreement attempts over the last two decades to reconstitute the state that existed when Barre came to power, but these agreements persistently fail due to clan rivalries and misrepresentation of all the clans in talks.  From 1996-1997, for example, the Sodere Conference in Ethiopia introduced the “4.5 formula” – a clever formula designed to enable fair power-sharing among the large Somali clan-families – however, it was regarded as a discriminatory and controversial policy at the cost of the smaller clans and minorities (the 0.5) and was later seen to create more problems among the Somalis than it solved.[11]

In December 2008, the International Crisis Group reported that the situation in Somalia had deteriorated into the world’s worst humanitarian and security crises.[12]  Somalia generates the world’s third highest number of refugees (following Afghanistan and Iraq), and in February 2013, there were 1.25 million Somali refugees in the Horn of Africa region, mainly hosted in Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti and Tanzania, with almost 1.36 million Somalis internally displaced, settled mainly in the South-Central region.[13]   

The rise of radical Islam in Somalia

Since the events of 9/11, Somalia has become the subject of renewed attention from the US and Europe, and the threat that Somalia poses as an archetype of a failed state – the lack of a central government, its violent factional politics, and the presence of Islamic extremist groups – has been equated to that which the US faced in Afghanistan.[14]  The history of Islam in the Horn of Africa dates back nearly 1400 years, when it reached the region from the Arabian Peninsula through trade and migration, mainly from Yemen and Oman.[15]  A large-scale conversion to Islam was taking place in Somalia by 1400 AD, first spread by the Dir clan-family, but followed by the rest of the nation.  Closely linked to the genealogical myths that buttress their clan identity, most Somalis practice a Shafi’i version of the faith, characterised by the veneration of saints (including the ancestors of many Somali clans) and has traditionally been dominated by apolitical Sufi orders.[16]

Although some Sufi orders were actively involved in anti-colonial resistance, the emergence of a modern political Islamic consciousness began to gather momentum in the 1960s, with the formation of the Waxda al-Shabaab al-Islaami and the Jama’at al-Ahl al-Islaami, both inspired by Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood that sought to apply Islamic principles in the context of a newly independent, modernising Somali state.[17]  It has been argued that the newfound political Islamic consciousness did not lie so much in the change of the dynamics of local politics, but rather in the change of Somalia’s international engagement.[18] Somalia became a member of the Arab League in 1974 to obtain access to international aid and diplomatic support in their effort to claim the Ethiopian Somali region, the Ogaden, back.   The promulgation of new, controversial family legislation in 1975 by the Barre regime aggravated the religious leaders, and forced many of the organisations to operate underground.  In the years that followed, some Somali exiles became closely aligned with the Association of Muslim Brothers (Jam’iyyat al-Ikhwaan al-Muslimiin), adopting its emphasis on political action.  Others were exposed to more conservative Salafi ideas and the militant undercurrents associated with the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan.  The Somali government had inadvertently given a crucial boost to the burgeoning – albeit largely extraterritorial – Somali Islamist movement.[19]

Small circles of Islamic study groups and Muslim Brotherhood cells were active in Somalia by the late 1980s, especially in Mogadishu, and as elsewhere in the Islamic world, these groups were largely composed of educated young men.[20]  During the early years of state collapse and civil war, these groups attempted and mostly failed to take direct control of territories.  The most visible and radical group during this period was the al-Ittihad al-Islaami (the Islamic Union) group, which is based on the Wahhabist sect and an offspring of the Muslim Brotherhood.[21]  Al-Ittihad is distinguished from the other organisations because of its organisational discipline and its strategy of taking power by violence.  Al-Ittihad’s failed attempts to maintain direct control of territories taught them two key lessons: holding major towns made them fixed targets for powerful external adversaries (principally Ethiopia), and holding fixed territories invariably meant controlling one clan’s land or town, which resulted in the organisation being viewed as an occupying force or outsider.[22] 

Al-Ittihad adopted several tactics as a result, which defined most of their activities in the late 1990s.[23]  First, they concluded that clannish Somalia was not yet ready for Islamic rule and opted for a long-term strategy to educate the Somali society, with an emphasis on Islamic education.  Second, to avoid being targeted, al-Ittihad members chose to integrate themselves with the local Somali communities.  Third, where they have maintained a fixed physical space, al-Ittihad cells tended to be in strategically placed, but very isolated rural areas.  Fourth, to build up a power base, they have tended to move into commerce and sought to recruit businessmen into their cells.  Finally, and arguably the most important strategy, al-Ittihad adopted what can loosely be called the “Turabi” strategy, where instead of making an outright bid for control over local administrations, they rather sought to obtain control over key parts of administrations (such as the judiciary with Shari’a Law) while a secular authority presided over the administration as a whole.  Ideally, they hoped to achieve what Hassan al Turabi succeeded in doing for a time in Sudan: gradually phasing a civilian government out and indirectly controlling politics without ever claiming direct control of the administration.[24]  A common characteristic of militant organisations in Somalia is the extent to which their ideological roots and financial backing lie outside Somalia.[25] 

The evolution of al Shabab

The US, Somalia’s neighbours and even some Somalis have expressed concern over the years about the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in Somalia.[26]  The government coup in 1991 left a political vacuum, and after fifteen years of chaos – a period characterised by the outbreak of civil war between the tribal warlords – a fundamentalist Islamic group emerged in early 2006, gaining unprecedented support from many citizens.[27]  The Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), formerly a loose confederation of regional judiciary systems, defeated the ruling CIA-backed warlords that controlled Mogadishu in June 2006, becoming more politically powerful and relevant than the rival Transitional Federal Government (TFG) based in Baidoa.[28]  For many Somalis, the UIC appeared to be the long-sought solution to years of state collapse, reason enough to support the Islamists.[29]  Although the UIC did not enjoy any form of democratic legitimacy, the UIC nevertheless provided a higher level of security and a modest economic upsurge.[30]

The leadership of al-Ittihad, including Sheikh Ali Warsame, the brother in law of the former leader of Hizbul Islam, Sheikh Hassan Aweys, met in 2003 and decided to form a new political front.[31]  The young members of al-Ittihad, some of whom had fought in Afghanistan, disagreed with many of the decisions of the older members and decided to form their own movement – Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahedeen – while based in a town in northern Somalia, Las Anod.  Although al Shabab was not active and did not control any territory until 2007-2008, the primary objective of this group was irredentism[32] and to establish the “Greater Somalia” under Shari’a Law.  The Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in December 2006 led to the disintegration of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) system, and while the UIC leadership moved to Eritrea, al Shabab’s secretive leadership slowly took control over the resistance movement.[33]  After being exiled, the UIC split into two separate factions – the Alliance for the Re-liberalisation of Somalia (ARS) and al Shabab.  Many Somalis joined the fight against Ethiopian occupation.  

The leaders of al Shabab are not well known, save a few exceptions.  The principle leaders of al Shabab, the former military wing of the UIC, during its emergence were Aden Hashi Ayro, killed in 2008 during an US missile strike on his home in Dusamareb, and Ahmed Abdi Aw-Mohamed Godane.[34]  Ayro trained in Afghanistan with al Qaeda during the late 1990s, and Godane fought with al Qaeda in Afghanistan until the end of 2001, and both principle leaders thus put a chain of command patterned after the one used by al Qaeda into place in the structure of al Shabab.  Some of the key commanders and leadership members of al Shabab come from Somaliland – the semi-autonomous area in the north-west of Somalia – mainly from the Hawiye clan-family.[35]  Al Shabab is structured in three different layers: the top leadership (qiyadah), the foreign fighters (muhajirin) and local Somali fighters (ansar).[36]  Counting or even defining foreign fighters is almost an impossible task, but three kinds of foreign fighters have been identified: Somalis who were born across the borders in neighbouring countries, such as Kenya, and have the nationalities of those countries; Somalis who, or whose parents, were born in Somalia but who have grown up in diasporas and carry a foreign passport; and fighters who have no ethnic Somali connection.[37]

Foreign involvement in al Shabab takes on two forms: the transfer of strategy, tactics and ideology learned by Somali al Shabab leaders during their association with the Taliban and al Qaeda, and the recruitment of foreign fighters.[38]  Public statements by both organisations have unavoidably moved al Shabab and al Qaeda closer to each other.  The strategic significance of al Shabab to the US was raised in 2008, when the then Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice designated al Shabab as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist.[39]  Al Shabab only formally joined the ranks of al Qaeda in February 2012, where the emir (leader) of al Shabab, Godane, proclaimed that he “pledged obedience” to al Qaeda head, Ayman al Zawahiri, in a joint video.[40]   

The election of Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, an Islamist leader, as the president of an expanded TFG on 31 January 2009 resulted in dramatic changes in the political landscape of Somalia, triggering a series of shock waves that shook al Shabab to the core.[41]  The government shortly thereafter declared its commitment to codify and implement Shari’a, and discreet negotiations behind the scenes posed a danger to support for al Shabab as leaders were asked to abandon the armed struggle and to join the government.  Godane (also known as Mukhtar Abu Zubair) and his foreign jihadi allies conducted a discreet purge of al Shabab in late 2008, and replaced dozens of middle-ranking and low-level commanders and local administrators deemed ideologically too soft.

Apart from frequent suicide attacks carried out by al Shabab in Mogadishu and elsewhere, al Shabab carried out the twin suicide bombings in Uganda’s capital, Kampala, which killed 76 people watching the 2010 football World Cup final, in response to Uganda’s involvement in contributing – along with Burundi – the bulk of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), deployed in February 2007.[42]  Eritrea is al Shabab’s only regional ally, supporting the organisation to counter the influence of Ethiopia, its bitter enemy.  Al Shabab is estimated to have between 7000 and 9000 active fighters.  The paper now moves on to the evaluation section. 

Civil war and state collapse have rendered Somalia especially vulnerable to external influences, some which have assisted radical groups, such as al Shabab, to flourish, often part of a broader international network.  It is the combination of statelessness, insecurity and foreign sponsorship that have been identified as the root causes that produced Somali terrorist behaviour.  This section will provide the reader with a discussion on the effectiveness of post-9/11 counterterrorism strategies, proposed in the theoretical orientation section of the paper, pertaining to some successes achieved in Somalia against al Shabab.

A Somali epic: Central governance, part 15, version 4.5

With an eye towards accommodating Somalia’s complex ideological, historical, social, political and economic concerns, the fifteenth attempt since 1991 to restore central governance in Somalia saw the birth of the TFG, the product of protracted negotiations rather than elections, in 2004 in hotel conference rooms in neighbouring Kenya.[43]  Reflecting the influences of the clan-based society of Somalia, the TFG adopted the “4.5 formula,” evenly dividing representation in parliament amongst the four main clan-families – the Darod, Hawiye, Dir and Digle-Marifle – plus five minority constituencies.  In total, the TFG’s parliament consists of 550 members, having grown from an original 275 members.  From its founding in 2004 until June 2005, the TFG had to meet in neighbouring Kenya out of security fears.  From June 2005 until February 2006, the parliament did not convene, and convened again finally on Somali soil in the western city of Baidoa from February 2006.[44]

The election of Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, the former head of the deposed UIC, as the new president of an expanded TFG on 31 January 2009 resulted in dramatic changes in the political landscape of Somalia, triggering a series of shock waves that shook al Shabab to the core.[45]  In March 2009, the TFG adopted a Somali version of Shari’a, challenging the legitimacy of al Shabab as the preferred vessel to Islamise Somalia.  The International Crisis Group, however, argued in February 2011 that relatively stable regions in the north of Somalia (Somaliland and Puntland) refused to recognise the authority of the TFG, while most of central and southern Somalia remained under the control of al Shabab.[46]  Despite substantial financial assistance and much other help, the TFG remained a caricature of a government, unable to deal with humanitarian catastrophe and protect its citizens from al Shabab and other violent groups, and confined to Mogadishu.  Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, former academic and activist, defeated ex-President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed in September 2012, to become the newly elected President of Somalia by a new TFG parliament.[47]

Successes of the African Union Mission in Somalia

AMISOM has been active in Somalia since March 2007, following the formal authorization of the Mission by the United Nations Security Council on 20 February 2007, and is mainly made up of troops from Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti and Kenya.[48]  AMISOM replaced and subsumed the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Peace Support Mission to Somalia (IGASOM)[49], and is mandated to “conduct Peace Support Operations in Somalia to stabilize the situation in the country in order to create conditions for the conduct of Humanitarian activities”.[50]  It is tasked to:

  • Support dialogue & reconciliation in Somalia, working with all stakeholders.
  • Provide protection to Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) and key infrastructure to enable them carry out their functions.
  • Provide technical assistance & other support to the disarmament and stabilization efforts.
  • Monitor the security situation in areas of operation.
  • Facilitate humanitarian operations including repatriation of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).

AMISOM has grown and become better resourced over the last couple of years, with the international community appearing willing to increase support, because it regards AMISOM as the last line of containment against al Shabab.[51]  By 2011, however, it was felt that the training the TFG troops received from AMISOM troops and other international partners was not sufficient, in that the TFG had not been able to capture and hold large insurgent controlled sections of Mogadishu.[52]  Mainly AMISOM troops, and militias allied to it, prosecuted the war against al Shabab, resulting in the slow expansion of government control.  One of the major successes of the Mission was achieved in August 2011 when AMISOM troops together with TFG forces pushed al Shabab fighters out of the capital, Mogadishu.[53]  Another recent success resulted in al Shabab losing control of its last strategic stronghold on the southern coast of Somalia, Kismayo, in September 2012.[54]  On 7 March 2013, the United Nations Security Council decided to authorise the Member States of the African Union to maintain the deployment of AMISOM until 28 February 2014.[55]

A new approach to state-building in Somalia

Seth Kaplan argues that much of the blame for the deepening nightmare in Somalia should be placed on the international community, where its unimaginative approach to state-building misconstrues Somalia’s sociopolitical context, showing little understanding of how a top-down approach impacts the state’s decentralised clan structures.[56]  Kaplan argues that the international community should work directly with the clans and sub-clans and assist them in establishing a series of regional governments patterned on those already enjoying a high level of functionality and operation in Somaliland and Puntland.  It is argued that these entities, with some international support, could serve almost all of their population’s day-to-day needs – from education to health care and policing, and in resolving business and family disputes.  A central government should be retained, but its functions strictly limited in scope and its institutions in number.[57]

After more than two decades of state collapse, Somalia made a number of commendable strides on the political front.  In September 2011, a political roadmap was agreed upon by the major Somali constituencies, detailing the delivery of transitional milestones before the expiry of the TFG’s mandate.[58]  The international responses to the roadmap in the form of the London and Istanbul conferences once again illustrated the international community’s increased interest in Somalia.  The London Conference on Somalia on February, 23 2012, aimed at achieving a ‘Somali consensus’ for international cooperation after the transition period ended in August 2012, attracted over 40 heads of states, including representatives from the US, UK, the TFG and Turkey.[59]  The inclusive nature of the Istanbul II conference, held from May 31 to June 1, 2012, was highlighted by the high-level representation from 57 countries and 11 international and regional organisations, including the TFG leadership, regional administrations and Somali society consisting of segments of the youth, women, business, elders, religious leaders and Somali diaspora.[60]

The transitional national charter, adopted as part of the Djibouti peace process (2008-2009), mandated a number of requisite tasks, including the drafting of a new constitution, that had to be achieved by the TFG within six years, but by 2011, however, very little progress had been made.[61]  The transitional parliament’s term, due to expire at the time, was extended by an additional three years, and the TFG’s mandate was extended with an additional year to August 2012, with the signing of the Kampala Accords.  Although the April 1, 2012 deadline was missed, the new constitution was approved by the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) – composed of 825 prominent Somalis – on August 2, 2012 amid failed suicide attacks.[62]  Hassan Sheik Mohamud, a teacher and activist, won the presidential election on September 10, 2012 against outgoing president, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, by a legislative vote of 190 to 79.[63]  Although the transitional period and the TFG have officially ended, new president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and the NCA will face many challenges in the continuing Somali peace process, with al Shabab and Somalia’s failed state status still persisting. 


For decades, the hapless citizens of Somalia had to bear the scars of both state failure and an Islamist dictatorship. With Mogadishu and other towns now under the control of the NCA, there is a new feeling of hope in the country, with many Somalis returning from exile, bringing their money and skills with them.[64]  Somalia reflects the positive side of counter-terrorism where domestic political will, regional support in the form of AMISOM and international assistance seen in the like of the London Conference all coalesce to eradicate the scourge of terrorism on this blighted continent of Africa. It is a lesson which needs to be examined by those attempting to respond to Islamists in both Mali and Nigeria.

If Mogadishu could now provide effective services to its citizens, its legitimacy will be enhanced amongst ordinary citizens. This, in turn, will further undermine the Islamist extremists. The international community needs to effectively and critically engage with the Somali government institutions as it seeks to build state capacity towards this end.

[1] Ruan van der Walt is a postgraduate student in the Department of Political Studies and Governance at the University of the Free State, South Africa focusing on the threat to secular polities by the rise of religious fundamentalism.

[2] Michael Walls, The Emergence of a Somali State: Building Peace from Civil War in Somaliland, African Affairs, 108/432 (2009): 371-389, 371.  

[3] Seth Kaplan, Rethinking State-Building in a Failed State, The Washington Quarterly, 33/1 (2010): 81-97, 82. 

[4] Mohamed Ibrahim, Somalia and Global Terrorism: A Growing Connection?, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 28/3 (2010): 283-295, 283.

[5] Kaplan, Rethinking State-Building in a Failed State, 82.

[6] Brian J. Hesse, The Myth of ‘Somalia,’ Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 28/3 (2010): 247-259, 247.

[7] Andrew Linke and Clionadh Raleigh, State and Stateless Violence in Somalia, African Geographical Review, 30/1 (2011): 47-66, 47. 

[8] Ibrahim, Somalia and Global Terrorism: A Growing Connection?, 283. 

[10] Kaplan, Rethinking State-Building in a Failed State, 82.

[11] Ibrahim, Somalia and Global Terrorism: A Growing Connection?, 284. 

[12] International Crisis Group, Somalia: To Move Beyond the Failed State, Africa Report No 147 (2008): i.

[13] Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Somalia Fact Sheet (February 2013) [online] <;.

[14] Georg-Sebastian Holzer, Political Islam in Somalia: A Fertile Ground for Radical Islamic Groups?, Geopolitics of the Middle East, 1/1 (2008): 23-42, 23.  

[15] Ibid., 23.

[16] International Crisis Group, Somalia’s Islamists, Africa Report No 100 (2005): 1. 

[17] Ibid., 1.

[18] Holzer, Political Islam in Somalia: A Fertile Ground for Radical Islamic Groups?, 25.

[19] Ibid., 1.

[20] Ken Menkhaus, Political Islam in Somalia, Middle East Policy, 9/1 (2002): 109-123, 112.

[21] Holzer, Political Islam in Somalia: A Fertile Ground for Radical Islamic Groups?, 27.

[22] Menkhaus, Political Islam in Somalia, 114.

[23] Ibid., 114-116.

[24] Ibid., 116.

[25] Matt Bryden, No Quick Fixes: Coming to Terms With Terrorism, Islam and Statelessness in Somalia, The Journal of Conflict Studies, Fall (2003): 24-56, 27. 

[26] Ted Dagne, Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace, Congressional Research Services Report prepared for Congress, RL33911 (October 2010), 4. 

[27] Melissa Simpson, An Islamic Solution to State Failure in Somalia, Geopolitics of the Middle East, 2/1 (2009): 31-49, 33.

[28] Michael Shank, Understanding Political Islam in Somalia, Contemporary Islam (2007). 

[29] Ken Menkhaus, The Crisis in Somalia: Tragedy in Five Acts, African Affairs, 106/204 (2007): 357-390, 371. 

[30] Apuuli P. Kasaija, The UN-led Djibouti Peace Process for Somalia 2008-2009: Results and Problems, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 28/3 (2010): 261-282, 265.

[31] Dagne, Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace, 5. 

[32] Irredentism is defined as the desire to unite a community that is currently divided under one flag.  Alex Thomson, An Introduction to African Politics (Abingdon 2004), 29.

[33] Dagne, Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace, 5.  

[34] David Shinn, Al Shabaab’s Foreign Threat to Somalia, Orbis, Spring (2011): 203-215, 207. 

[35] Dagne, Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace, 6. 

[36] Shinn, Al Shabaab’s Foreign Threat to Somalia, 209.

[37] Ibid., 210.

[38] Shinn, Al Shabaab’s Foreign Threat to Somalia, 207. 

[39] Condoleeza Rice, Designation of al-Shabab, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (March 18, 2008) [online] <;.

[40] Al Jazeera, Al Shabab “Joins Ranks” With Al Qaeda (10 February 2012) [online] <;.

[41] International Crisis Group, Somalia’s Divided Islamists, Policy Briefing, Africa Briefing No 74 (May 2010): 6. 

[42] British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Q&A: Who are Somalia’s Al Shabaab? (October 5, 2012) [online] <;.

[43] Hesse, The Myth of ‘Somalia,’ 252.  

[44] Ibid., 253.

[45] International Crisis Group, Somalia’s Divided Islamists, Policy Briefing, Africa Briefing No 74 (May 2010): 6. 

[46] International Crisis Group, Somalia: The Transitional Federal Government on Life Support, Africa Report No 170 (2011), 1. 

[47] BBC, Q&A: Who Are Somalia’s Al Shabaab?

[48] UN Security Council, Resolution 1744 (2007), S/RES/1744.

[49] AMISOM, AMISOM Background [online] <;.

[50] AMISOM, AMISOM Mandate [online] <;.

[51] International Crisis Group, Somalia: The Transitional Federal Government on Life Support, 17.

[52] Ibid., 15.

[53] Jeffrey Gettleman and Mohammed Ibrahim, Shabab Concede Control of Capital to Somalia Government, New York Times (August 6, 2011) [online] <;.

[54] BBC, Q&A: Who Are Somalia’s Al Shabaab?

[55] UN Security Council, Resolution 2093 (2013), S/RES/2093. 

[56] Kaplan, Rethinking State-Building in a Failed State, 89.

[57] Ibid., 90. 

[58] Knox Chitiyo and Anna Rader, Somalia 2012: Ending the Transition?, The Brenthurst Foundation Discussion Paper 4 (2012) [online] < brenthurst_commisioned_reports/ Brenthurst-paper-201204-Somalia-2012-Ending-the-Transition.pdf>.

[59] Chitiyo and Rader, Somalia 2012: Ending the Transition?

[60] Chitiyo and Rader, Somalia 2012: Ending the Transition?

[61] Chitiyo and Rader, Somalia 2012: Ending the Transition?

[62] Mary Harper, Somalia: Failed State or Fantasy Land?, BBC News (August 3, 2012) [online] <;.

[63] The Guardian, Somalia’s New President Officially Takes Power After Assassination Attempt, The Guardian Online (September 16, 2012) [online] <;.

[64] BBC, Q&A: Who Are Somalia’s Al Shabaab?

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