Will Emergency Rule Curb Boko Haram Violence? – Dr. Oyeniyi Bukola Adeyemi
Will Emergency Rule Curb Boko Haram Violence?
by Oyeniyi Bukola Adeyemi (Ph. D)
RIMA Policy Papers, Volume 1 (2013), Number 2 (May 2013)
- I. Introduction
On Tuesday May 7, 2013, 1900 hours Nigerian time, President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan announced a State of Emergency (SoE) in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe States. For many Nigerians, especially Christians and other citizens below the River Niger, the President is late in coming to grips with the reality of Boko Haram’s violence and ought to have made the declaration a long time ago. These people have also asked why states such as Gombe and Bauchi, Kano and Plateau, Taraba and Benue, as well as Nasarawa State were spared. The Nigerian Governors Forum, however, considered the declaration as an unwelcome development, which would solve no problem.
While opinions differ from North to South on the declaration, Boko Haram’s immediate reaction was to trail the Borno State Secretary of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), Reverend Faye Pama Musa, to his Maiduguri home where he was shot dead. In this essay, I examine the political, social, and security implications of this announcement on Nigeria’s quest for peace and security through counter-terrorism measures. Put differently, can emergency rule and extreme force win the war against Boko Haram in Nigeria?
II. Boko Haram: A Janus-faced phenomenon
As recent studies have shown, Boko Haram can be located within two important paradigms. On the first hand, it is an expression of a deep-seating socio-economic and political discontent, which can be traced back to the pre-independence periods. Colonial administrators deliberately prevented Christianity, which was the handmaiden of Western education, to have a root in northern Nigeria during the colonial period. This explains the educational disparity between northern and southern Nigeria. It also explains religious pluralism and cooperative inter-faith relations in the south as against monolithic religious universe and religious intolerance of the north.
In as much as colonial rule used only Western educated personnel, it is only sensible that southern Nigeria would develop faster than northern Nigeria. Lagos, rather than Kano or Sokoto emerged as the seat of government and socio-economic and infrastructural developments inadvertently favoured southern Nigeria over the north. It is its attempts to adjust these imbalances that made northern Nigeria obstinately cling to state power. From 1960 to date (2013), the North remains in control of the central government, with the 64% of the Heads of State and President of the Federation being Northerners. Under the current dispensation, except for the President, other key positions such as the Vice president, Senate President, Speaker House of Representatives, Peoples Democratic Party National Chairman, Head of Service, Independent National Electoral Commission Chairman, Chief Justice of Nigeria, Central Bank of Nigeria’s Governor, Inspector General of Nigeria Police, President Court of Appeal, Chief Judge Federal High Court, National Security Adviser, Economic and other Financial Crime Commission Chairman, Chief of Defense Staff, Chief of Air Staff, General Managing Director or the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporations, Comptroller of Prison Service, Comptroller of Custom Service, Comptroller of Immigration Service, Clerk of the National Assembly, Clerk of the House of Representatives are all Northerners.
In addition to the above, the richest man in Africa is ironically a Northerner. Eighty-five per cent of petroleum marketers in Nigeria, eighty per cent of the oil block owners in Nigeria are northerners. Notwithstanding its dominance in controlling Nigeria, northern Nigeria remains the most backward segment of the nation. It has the highest number of beggars. The majority of unemployed youths in Nigeria are found in northern Nigeria. The most educationally backward area, the poorest states in Nigeria, and the most volatile area in Nigeria – Boko Haram as a current example – are all in northern Nigeria.
How did the nation, especially northern Nigeria, get to this sorry state? There are different explanations. Without let or hindrance, it can be said that while colonial rule may have planted the seed of backwardness in northern Nigeria, its leaders have fostered it to their own detriment. Nigeria, today, is reaping the fruits of its leaders’ cluelessness.
While military rule lasted, corruption of the darkest hue, which benefited these Nigerian leaders, reigned supreme. Opposition, mostly from the south, were stifled with the highest force possible, including state terrorism. The advent of democratic rule therefore means that grievances, which have been bottled up under military rule, were suddenly finding expression with the newfound freedom. The Maitatsine uprising of the 1980s is a case in point. Prior to Boko Haram, Nigeria had experienced a systematic and sustained burst of violence. Oodua People’s Congress (OPC) unleashed terror on the police in what the Yoruba people of Southwest Nigeria said was an attempt to liberate the Yoruba “race” from Nigeria. Interethnic clashes between OPC and Hausa communities hit the Southwest, with immediate reprisals in northern Nigeria, especially the city of Kano. The Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) also began operations to liberate the Igbo “race” from Nigeria. They were soon to be followed by Bakassi Boys and the Egbesu Boys, which later morphed into the Niger Delta militants. In the north, Arewa Youth Forum soon joined in the fight to liberate the Hausa/Fulani “race”. Agitation for the Sharia and its attendant riots soon broke out, as state governments in Northern Nigeria introduced Islamic rule in defiance of the constitution which makes Nigeria a secular state. As I have argued elsewhere, from ethnic irredentists to religious bigots, these groups were propped-up by the politicians, who deployed them as militias to, among other things, cow their opponents and secure their holds on power.
Underlying these developments are two things: extreme poverty and politics. While poverty, imposed on the people by a clueless political class, reduces the masses to beggars and hanger-on, politics helps in sustaining the state of the nation in a way that the political class can recycle itself at the expense of the nation. This unsavoury situation gave birth to Boko Haram and other fundamentalist groups in Nigeria today.
On the other hand, Boko Haram is an expression of a global Islamic fundamentalism, notable for two things: internal reform in Islam and the imposition of Islamic rule. The growth and development of radical Islam in contemporary Nigeria can best be traced to the proselytizing works of Sheik Ibrahim El-Zakzakky (Muslim Brotherhood), Ahmad Gulan (Ahmadiya Movement), Nasir Kabara (Khadiriyya), Abubakar Gumi (Izala), Isiaku Rabiu (Tijjaniyya) and Dahiru Bauchi (Tariqqa). These men, at different times, founded and led different groups with Shitte Islamic inclinations across northern Nigeria. Although different, the groups claimed to be following the paths prescribed by Allah in the Quran and Hadith of Prophet Mohammed. The two components of these paths are leading a pious, religious life and the enthronement of an Islamic government.
Of these men, Sheik Ibrahim El-Zakzakky, who read Economics in the 1970s at the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, was the most influential. El-Zakzakky, inspired by the Islamic activism in the Middle East, especially Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan where there were age-long agitation to establish an Islamic state, founded the Muslim Brotherhood. Even as a student, he had a large following. The core of the Brotherhood’s teaching was that Muslims should live according to the dictates of the Quran, and to shun immoralities. While El-Zakzakky was moderate in his belief and teachings, others were not and his group soon fractured, with some denouncing El-Zakzakky’s Shitte ideology. These breakaway groups were displeased with the leader’s pacifist approach and were ready to bear arms in their quest to implement the Sharia in Nigeria. One of the most popular of these breakaway groups was the Kano-based Jama’atul Tajdidi Islam (JTI). The JTI was not limited to northern Nigeria, as it recruits young and idealistic members from across schools, mosques and cities in Nigeria. Besides living a pious religious life, the fulcrum of its advocacy was the implementation of the Sharia in Nigeria.
Besides its leader, other renowned members of the JTI include Aminu Gusau, Hussein Bauchi, and Ahmed Shuaibu. Until his breaking away from the JTI to join Boko Haram, which was founded by Abubakar Lawan, Muhammed Yusuf was JTI’s ‘amir’ (leader of the faithful) for Borno State.
Other breakaway groups include the Talibans, a group of young radical university students who caused a stir in 2003 when they struck in Yobe State, killing policemen, burning down police stations and attacking Christians. Also in this garb is the Kala Kato, a strictly scripturalist group led by Isiyaka Salisu, who stated that only the Qur’an provides a reliable guide for Islamic worship, and that his group ‘don’t use Hadiths as a guide to the way we worship Allah. We restrict ourselves to what the Qur’an’ says. Similarly, the Darul Islam, a puritanical group led by Bashir Abdullahi Sulaiman, who also espoused that isolation, practiced by his group, is geared towards practicing the Islamic faith ‘in the most discreet form as possible’ and to ensure that he and his followers did not mix with the many sinful people of this world. Members of Darul Islam refrain from educating their children except in Islamic and Quranic education. As its leader noted: ‘… We believe (that) what obtains in Western Education schools is haram… For instance, children in common schools are taught that man originated from an ape; this differs from the knowledge we believe in, i.e., that man was created by God, through Prophet Adam’.
Since its debut, Boko Haram has wreaked havoc through bombings, kidnappings, arsons, robberies, etc. in Borno and Yobe, Adamawa and Gombe, Bauchi and Kano, Plateau and Taraba, Benue and Nasarawa states. The group has demonstrated the capacity not only to overrun state security mechanisms, but also to link up with global terror network to further their causes in Nigeria and West Africa. Not only its attack on the United Nations Building in Abuja, but also its operations across borders and linkages with al-Qaeda in the Maghreb marked it as a danger to global peace.
Prior to May 7, 2013, Nigeria had adopted a number of counter-terrorism measures, including the carrot and stick approach, dialogue and amnesty, etc. in combating Boko Haram. Not only has the group rebuffed these measures, its activities have since been scaled up and the group has also fractured into, at least, three other groups. Since January 2013, the group had taken over control of Marte, Mobbar, Gubio, Guzamala, Abadam, Kukawa, Kala-Balge and Gamboru Ngala local government areas in northern Borno, chasing out local government officials and taking over control of government building and imposing the Sharia law.
Several attempts at dialoguing with the group failed. The most recent of these being on 17th April 2013, when the President set up a 26-member Amnesty Committee (headed by Nigerian Special Duties Minister Kabiru Taminu) with a three-month mandate to try and convince the group to lay down their arms in exchange for a state pardon and social reintegration. Dialogue broke down, as the group cited government insincerity, and scaled up its activities. On 9th May 2013, 200 Boko Haram gunmen, armed with rocket launchers and rifles, launched coordinated attacks on security forces in Bama, northern Borno, including a military barracks, a prison and police buildings, killing 42 people including soldiers, policemen, prison guards and civilians and freeing 105 inmates. Some 13 members of Boko Haram were killed during this attack. In a 13th May 2013 video, Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau rejected the government amnesty programme and vowed not to stop his group’s activities, more importantly, the establishment of an Islamic state in Nigeria.
These developments prompted President Jonathan to declare that he would “take all necessary actions… to put an end to the impunity of the insurgents and terrorists”, including the arrest and detention of suspects, taking over of the group’s hideouts, the lockdown of the group’s enclaves, raids, and arresting anyone possessing dangerous weapons.
- III. The State of Emergency (SoE) in Nigeria
Section 305 (3 (c) (d) (f) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, as amended, empowers the President to issue a state of emergency when, “there is actual breakdown of public order and public safety, there is a clear and present danger of an actual breakdown of public order and safety in the federation or any part to require extraordinary measure to restore peace and security or to avert such danger”. Boko Haram is, no doubt, a threat to public order and safety in Nigeria. The situation in the nation has reached a state whereby government must take all measures, including SoE, to restore peace and security as well as to avert further danger to other citizens. The declaration of a state of emergency in three of the affected states on May 7, 2013 by the President is therefore constitutional and appropriate. However, given the two underlying factors driving religious fundamentalism in northern Nigeria raised in the previous section, can a declaration of a state of emergency in Boko Haram-affected states make Nigeria terrorism-free? What are the socio-political and security implications of the SoE on Nigeria? In this section, the essay finds answers to these and other questions.
No sooner than the SoE was announced that Boko Haram acted. In addition, political leaderships across the country have been singing discordant tunes. In the north, the SoE is considered inappropriate. Mohammed Kyari, a political science professor at Modibo Adama University of Science and Technology in Adamawa State, noted that “It will now be difficult to win the confidence of Boko Haram, which is crucial in bringing them to the negotiating table because you can’t talk of peace on one hand and be deploying troops on the other”. Whatever is the merit of this view, Yahaya Mahmud, a renowned Nigerian constitutional lawyer, noted that:
No government anywhere will allow a group to usurp part of (its) territorial sovereignty. The declaration of a state of emergency was necessitated by the constitutional obligation to restore a portion of Nigeria’s territory taken over by an armed group, which involves the suspension of constitutional provisions relating to civic rights.
Views from southern Nigeria resonate with Mahmud. For many, it was, in fact, late in coming. Despite the controversies, official reports claim that in the first few days of the SoE, about 50 members of the group had been killed while as much as about 100 had been taken into custody. In addition, it was stated that many of the bases of the group were already destroyed. Media reports also asserted that members of the group may have escaped into other states in the north and cases of attacks in some other states have in deed been reported. In addition to these, it was reported that owing to airstrikes by Nigerian fighter jets on Boko Haram’s camps and bases, tens of thousands of residents of northeastern Nigeria’s Borno State have fled their homes – thousands of them into neighbouring Niger, Chad and Cameroon. Musa Karimbe told Integrated Regional Network that he and his people, numbering about 200, fled Bulabute, a village near Marte and 100km to Cameroon, for fear of a “repeat of Baga attacks on our homes”. It must be remembered that following Boko Haram’s attack at Baga, troops from the Chad-Niger-Nigeria Joint Multi-National Task Force engaged in a fight with Boko Haram at the end of which 187 residents were killed and 2, 128 houses were razed to the ground. Although official figures are few at the moment, recent reports however confirmed that thousands of people have fled from villages around Abadam District, including Malamfatori, to Bosso in Niger’s Diffa Region, while others sought refuge in Fotokol, Amchide, Darak and Kusiri in Cameroon.
Notwithstanding the so-called successes or failures of the initial efforts, SoE may be revoked sooner than expected, as Section 305(2) & 6(b) of Nigeria’s Constitution goes further to state that, “The President shall transmit such copies of the gazette with details to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, each of whom shall forthwith convene a sitting to consider the situation and decide whether or not to pass a resolution approving the proclamation”. In both houses of the National Assembly, not only were majority from the ruling Peoples’ Democratic Party, but they were also from northern Nigeria. If the President is right, some members of the National Assembly and the Federal Executive Council are members and/or sympathizers of Boko Haram. If these members and/or sympathizers of Boko Haram are in the majority, the possibility of the National Assembly rejecting the SoE is higher and a constitutional crisis may arise.
A curious observation in the SoE declared in Nigeria is that the political structures of the three respective states are allowed to coexist and work side by side with the new military commands. Although SoE has a long history in Nigeria, this dual-power structure is unprecedented. This, undoubtedly, is not an accident. It is a political move that could allow Abuja to secure political supports for the SoE both in these three states and within the hierarchy of the ruling party. However, could this also sway the loyalty of members and/or sympathizers of Boko Haram in the National Assembly and the Federal Executive Council? Could this also become an asset for the sitting president in the 2015 General elections? Whatever the logic of the dual power structure, the question remains: who holds the ace in state matters between the very state structure that failed initially to control Boko Haram or the new military command? It is too early to say how workable this would be and much remains in the womb of time.
Even if answers to these questions are not within the immediate reach, Nigerians expect from the government of President Jonathan an immediate end to the Boko Haram dissension and the SoE imposed on innocent citizens of the country.
- IV. SoE versus A Comprehensive Counter-Terrorism Measures
Successful conflict resolution usually involves fostering communication between parties, adopting different problem-solving approaches to resolve underlying issues in conflicts, and drafting agreements that meet these underlying issues. Undoubtedly, dialogue and amnesty have been tried with no positive results. The posturing of Boko Haram, in itself, shows that the group favours only a winner-takes-all result as against a win-win solution or mutually satisfying scenario. In this section, the essay looks at whether or not SoE can rein-in Boko Haram and argues for a comprehensive approach to counter-terrorism.
As noted earlier, Nigeria is not new to SoEs. It was imposed in Southwestern Nigeria immediately after independence and, later, in Southeastern Nigeria during the Civil War. In the 1980s and 2000s, it was imposed in different parts of Northern Nigeria and the Niger-Delta region in the south. In all these cases, evidence abounds to support the argument that while peace-enforcement is achieved on the short-run, SoEs, on the long-term, generate new conflicts of their own. Unlike the on-going SoEs, regional, states, and local government political structures were made to come under the emergency military powers in the previous SoEs: could the decision to keep the erstwhile political structures arise from lessons learnt from the previous SoEs?
From the previous SoEs, we can argue that unless this newly imposed SoE is backed up by a comprehensive counter-terrorism measure, it will achieve, on the one hand, the immediate aim of peace-enforcement and, on the other hand, postpone peace-building. Over the long term, it will deepen the very factors underlying terrorism and conflicts in Nigeria. This is not peculiar to Nigeria. It also applies to other parts of Africa where terrorism is playing itself out.
Both peace-enforcement and peace building are important measures in conflict resolution. In the specific case of Boko Haram, President Jonathan waited for too long in asserting and deploying his presidential powers, especially as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. For too long, the president allowed blackmail and political considerations, especially his supposed vested interests in contesting the 2015 Presidential Election, to cage him over Boko Haram. This attitude encouraged Boko Haram and its sympathizers to gain supports, not only locally within Nigeria, but also globally with other terror networks. As things stand, the 2015 General Election may not hold should Nigeria implode into civil war. It is therefore foolhardy for government, politicians, ethnic and religious jingoists, or sympathizers of Boko Haram to, at any time, allow anyone or group to usurp governmental powers and undermine the nation’s national security.
Boko Haram has undoubtedly declared an open war against the government of Nigeria. Its alliances with al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda in the Maghreb indicate that it is allying with alien forces to impose a rule or a system of government that is alien to the nation’s constitution on the country. On these grounds, it will be foolishness on the part of government not to return fire for fire. It is with this mindset that SoE is acceptable in reining in Boko Haram. However, military engagement with Boko Haram and its supporters whether within Nigeria or outside must be limited to enforcing the peace.
Dialogue with Boko Haram is non-negotiable, as it remains the only way to get to the roots of the problem. While military engagement with Boko Haram is on-going, government should also find a middle ground to encourage and accommodate members of the group who may like to surrender. Amnesty should also be used as a carrot to break the ranks of Boko Haram. These two measures will give the Nigerian government the much-needed opportunities to break the ranks of Boko Haram and deny the group’s leadership foot soldiers to prosecute further war against the state.
Given Boko Haram’s stated objectives of Islamizing Nigeria and imposing the Sharia law on the country, government cannot and should not negotiate with Boko Haram. Dialogue does not necessarily imply or lead to negotiation. Negotiation, as generally understood in conflict resolution and security studies, deals with trade-off. Nigeria cannot trade-off its secular nature to please either a militant group or its sympathizers.
It is sad that every problem, including poverty, in Nigeria is easily politicized and interpreted along ethno-religious lines. Boko Haram constitutes a threat to all Nigerians, irrespective of religious leanings, ethnic identities and political persuasions. Mr. Badamosi Ayuba Damabatta, a member of the House of Representatives from Kano State and a member of the ANPP, recently denounced the SoE, and asserted, among other things, that “I advocate dialogue between Boko Haram and the government.” While dialogue is undoubtedly necessary to resolving the Boko Haram problem, it baffles logic that Mr. Damabatta does not consider himself a part of the government. One would expect that if any member of government can dialogue with Boko Haram and get them to lay down their arms, he or she should do just that. Until Nigerians realize that bloodshed and destruction in any part of Nigeria affects other parts of the country, Nigeria will remain underdeveloped and insecure.
Far and most important to reining in Boko Haram is the need to understand and address the underlying socio-economic problems underwriting conflicts and terrorism in Africa. As far as Nigeria is concerned, terrorism festered because of poverty. As Hussein Solomon has shown, from Somalia to Nigeria, Mali to Egypt, terrorism festers in areas with higher poverty rate. In Nigeria, poverty rate in southern Nigeria stands at 27% while it is 72% in northern Nigeria. In both Nigeria and Mali, Boko Haram and Ansar Dine, as it is also the case with Al-Shabaab in Somalia, took up arms against governments where poverty is most high.
Where access and control of resources remains a problem, agitation against the state is usually high. The case of the Niger-Delta is an immediate example. Government in Nigeria cannot continue to pauperize its people and expects obedience. Perhaps, there is no panacea to reining in Boko Haram and other fundamentalist groups in Nigeria other than good governance. Although statistics may not exist, Nigerians, however, believe that the federal government has never been sincere and transparent in its management of the economy. Political power is seen as a license to loot the nation’s resources. As studies have shown concerning Boko Haram, many of the fundamentalist groups in northern Nigeria have been, at one point or the other used by politicians to win elections. Unmet promises, in the face of a rapacious political class, therefore plays fundamental role in the emergence of Boko Haram. No amount of state-terrorism in the guise of SoE can win public support to any government, only good governance can.
- V. By Way of Conclusion
From the above analysis, the study asserts the following points. Boko Haram, through its activities, has declared an open war against the corporate existence of Nigeria, and it is only logical for government in Nigeria to deploy superior military power to rein the group in and dislodge it. The group’s objective is a zero-sum game, which can only be achieved by liquidating the national goal of being a secular nation. A group cannot be bigger than the entire nation. The current fixation with dialoguing with Boko Haram must recognize the fact that dialogue does not necessarily lead to negotiation and trade-offs; rather, it plays important roles in (determining) ownership (of the group) and (accepting) responsibility (for its actions).
As demonstrated above, Boko Haram is not a single-story, but a Janus-faced phenomenon, which, on the one hand, underscores governance deficits in Nigeria and, on the other hand, shows how global issues can define local issues, irrespective of space and time. There is no doubt that counter-terrorism measures, so far, have discountenanced these important factors in their efforts to combat and control terrorism in Nigeria vis-à-vis Africa. Undoubtedly, the on-going SoE also strays away from these issues and, like other efforts before it; it is also bound to fail.
SoE can only enforce peace, not build it. It should therefore be a passageway to allow for other, if not more, comprehensive counter-terrorism measures to be injected into the efforts to ensure Nigeria’s national security. For the on-going SoE to achieve its peace-building objective on the long run, government must revamp the socio-economic system in Nigeria. A poor man, as the adage goes, is a willing tool in the hands of the devil.
Notes and References
 Dr. Oyeniyi Bukola Adeyemi is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Political Studies and Governance Department of the University of Free State, South Africa.
 Nigerian Tribune, “More Nigerians react to emergency rule in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa… Jonathan was playing to the gallery – FJHD coordinator”, available at http://tribune.com.ng/news2013/index.php/en/news/item/12079-more-nigerians-react-to-emergency-rule-in-borno-yobe-and-adamawa-jonathan-was-playing-to-the-gallery-fjhd-coordinator
 African Spotlight, “Minutes after emergency rule, gunmen kill Borno state secretary of CAN”, available at http://www.africanspotlight.com/2013/05/14/minutes-after-emergency-rule-gunmen-kill-borno-state-secretary-of-can/
 Oyeniyi, Bukola Adeyemi, “Boko Haram Terrorists’ Menace and Nigeria’s National Security” in Toyin Falola and Jane Nana (eds.), Social and Religious Movements in Africa, New York: Africa World Press, forthcoming 2013.
 Oyeniyi, Ibid.
 Suleiman T., “The Plot to Islamise Nigeria”, Tell Magazine, (November 30, 2009): 20.
 Oyeniyi, Bukola Adeyemi, “Boko Haram: One Voice, Multiple Tongues”, in Adeyinka Bankole and Shola J. Omotola (eds.), Whither The Nigerian Project? South Africa: JUTA, forthcoming 2013.
 Isa, S., “Kala-Kato: Meet Group with yet another Perception of Islam”, Weekly Trust, (August 15 2009): 2.
 Aliyu P., Ruqayya Y. and Lawa M., “We Will Not Vote—Darul Islam Leader”, Daily Trust, (August 16 2010): 1.
 Federal Government of Nigeria, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, See in particular section 305 (3) (c) (d) and (f), available at http://www.nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm
 Mohammed Kyari, cited in Integrated Regional Network, Analysis: Nigerians on the run as military combat Boko Haram, available at http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=98076
 Yahaya Mahmud, cited in Integrated Regional Network, Analysis: Nigerians on the run as military combat Boko Haram, available at http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=98076
 Brig-Gen Chris Olukolade, cited in Integrated Regional Network, Analysis: Nigerians on the run as military combat Boko Haram, available at http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=98076
 Kingsley Omonobi, “Jonathan orders release of detained suspected terrorists”, http://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/05/jonathan-orders-release-of-detained-terrorists/
 Integrated Regional Network, Analysis: Nigerians on the run as military combat Boko Haram, available at http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=98076
 See Human Rights Watch report on this at http://www.irinnews.org/Report/97988/Displaced-still-homeless-after-clashes-in-Baga-Nigeria.
 Integrated Regional Network, Analysis: Nigerians on the run as military combat Boko Haram, available at http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=98076
 See in particular, section 305(2) and 6(b) of the Nigerian constitution.
 Subsection 6 of the Constitution further states that a proclamation issued by the President shall cease to have effect within two days when the National Assembly is in session or within ten days when it is not in session, after its publication, if there is no resolution supported by two-thirds majority of all the members of the each House of the National Assembly approving this proclamation.
 Following crises in Western Region in the First Republic, a state of emergency was declared and Chief Obafemi Awolowo and others were detained. Following Ojukwu’s secessionist bid between 1967 and 1970, a state of emergency was declared across Eastern Nigeria. During the Maitaisene Riots in the 1980s, a state of emergency was declared in Kano, Zaria and Kaduna while under President Olusegun Obasanjo, Jos, Odi and Jesse experienced state of emergency declarations.
 Premium Times, “Nigerian lawmakers’ reactions to State of Emergency”, available at http://premiumtimesng.com/news/134505-nigerian-lawmakers-reactions-to-state-of-emergency.html
 Hussein Solomon, “Governance Reforms May Be More Effective Than Military in Countering Boko Haram”, accessed on 16th April 2013, available at http://africacenter.org/2013/04/governance-reforms-may-be-more-effective-than-military-in-countering-boko-haram-south-african-professor-tells-acss/