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An Interview of Professor Hussein Solomon to the Program on the Edge with Steve Marqs on Radio Telhai

An Interview of Professor Hussein Solomon to the Program on the Edge with Steve Marqs on Radio Telhai 

Hussein Solomon is a senior Professor of Political Studies at UOFS and a senior research fellow at RIMA, based in Jerusalem.
We discuss the recent terror attacks in Europe and Australia and the South African terror scenario.

ECOWAS invites a Zionist to address its conference – Dr. Glen Segell

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ECOWAS invites a Zionist to address its conference

By Glen Segell

RIMA Occasional Papers, Volume 5 (2017), Number 12 (June 2017)

It took amazing courage for the 15 African nations of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to invite Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu as the first non-African leader to address its conference.[1] He is an Israeli citizen, a Jew and an ardent Zionist.

The invitation and his address indicate that times are changing in sub-Saharan Africa. Some of the ECOWAS leaders are Muslims and some of the states are Islamic. No other forum in the world would have made such an invitation. It is a first for Africa and for relations between African Muslim leaders and the Zionist state.

Diplomacy is like a coin as it has two inseparable sides. On the side of this coin is Israel and on the other ECOWAS, where there were mutual objectives and where both of which benefitted from Netanyahu’s address.

On the Israeli side of the coin, is the leader. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel is also Israel’s Foreign Minister. Wearing two hats is not an exception and has become the rule in the Israeli Cabinet. The first Prime Minister after independence in 1948 David Ben Gurion was also Defence Minister. Doing two jobs is not just functional and practical but is also cost effective. Africa is of personal significance for Netanyahu, his brother having commanded the freeing of hostages from a hijacked Air France aircraft on 4 July 1976 in Entebbe Uganda, and having been killed in the operation.[2]

The practical and functional side of doing two jobs comes when the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister (the same person) wish to achieve the same goals (two birds with one stone). One “bird” is tackling Iran and its proxies Hamas and Hezbollah and the other “bird” is gaining recognition of Israel as the Jewish national homeland.[3] So this week Netanyahu travelled to western Africa and became the first non-African leader to address 15 African nations at the ECOWAS conference. There he met like-minded states who also wished to tackle Iran, but for different reasons.

In doing so the visit marks a new watershed in Israel’s relations with Africa and with and for Islam and Muslims in Africa. A brief note on why this is a watershed is spelt out by a spot history of Israel and Africa as a problematic friendship.[4]

From 1948 to 1967 Israel had good relations with post-colonial African states providing assistance including agriculture, education, military and construction. The relationship was close as both Israel and the African states had just achieved independence hence there was a shared understanding of a post-British rule world and as developing countries. However after the 1967 war many African states broke off diplomatic relations with Israel. There was strong coercion from the oil rich Arab world.

During the 1980’s after the peace treaty with Egypt and the return of the Sinai Peninsula, Israel strove to make strong headway in re-establishing ties. Although the process was slow it achieved its objectives. For example last year Guinea, a Muslim-majority country that was the first African nation to sever ties with Israel following the 1967 Six-Day War re-established diplomatic ties after a 49 year break.[5]

Every bit helps for Israel! Though most ECOWAS African states are small and poor compared to other states such as the G7, such diplomatic ties chip away at the boycott, sanctions and disinvestment (BDS) movement; and at the Middle East anti-Israel Islamic bloc in the United Nations. In this bloc Shia (Iran led) and Sunni (Saudi Arabia led) bury their differences to initiate debates, motions and votes against Israel.

Closing the gap in relations and isolating Iran is an important process for both Israel and for the ECOWAS states.This week’s visit was not Netanyahu’s first to Africa. Last year he visited the continent as the first sitting Israeli prime minister in 29 year to do so visiting Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia and Rwanda and meeting the presidents of Somalia and Kenya. This was of particular significance as those later two countries severed diplomatic relations with Iran in January 2016. Somalia received substantial aid from Saudi Arabia the day it severed the ties. Clearly Africa has become a proxy battleground between Shia Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia; giving further commonality with Israel.[6]

Looking closely at these visits of Netanyahu and his policy shows that the objectives of Israel’s focus towards Africa are no different from Israel’s foreign policy objectives towards all states and indeed those of the foreign policy of ECOWAS states in the international arena. It is therefore not surprising that Netanyahu was invited as the first non-African leader to address its conference even if he is an Israeli citizen, a Jew and an ardent Zionist.

At the top of the list for both Israel and ECOWAS states is recognition as independent sovereign states by all others; an aspiration of all post-colonial states after they threw off the colonial yoke of European imperialism.

For Israel implementing this policy includes improving the outcomes for the Jewish state in U.N. votes, expanding economic cooperation, curbing Iranian influence in Africa, establishing diplomatic relations with Muslim-African states and isolating Israel’s enemies such as Iran and its proxies Hamas and Hezbollah.

Turning to the other side of the coin begs the question “But what did the ECOWAS nations gain specifically by inviting Netanyahu other than symbolism?”No doubt that this is back to the future for 2017 looks like 1961 where Netanyahu at the ECOWAS conference offered Israel collaboration with African states in agriculture, desertification, trade, education, health, homeland security, cyber and communications, energy, culture and science, and the military, including terrorism. Some of these already started for example Israel for some years has become ever closer to Ghana, Mali and Niger in agricultural cooperation.[7] Hence as with most diplomatic appearances of this kind, it is sometimes informing the world of an ongoing process and testing the water for adverse reactions.

The importance of the ECOWAS address by Netanyahu cannot be understated. Listing the audience clearly shows states with an Islamic majority: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. For some terrorism also features prominently as do religious strife for example in Nigeria. Here Israel will be able to provide substantial experience.[8]

However not all went according to plan. The one country in Africa which has the closest historical ties to Judaism in contemporary times was not happy; and because of Netanyahu’s presence, Morocco’s King Mohammed VI cancelled plans to attend the ECOWAS conference.[9]

The cancellation shows that Africa is split demographically even though geographically it is one continent. This means that Africa is Africa but prompts the question about North Africa.It is sometimes known as the Maghreb due to its closer Islamic ties with the Middle East than sub-Sahara Africa. No doubt that the Zionist state will find that winning the hearts and minds of Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya and turning them against Iran will show that sub-Sahara ECOWAS-easy.

So while sub-Saharan African Muslims and Islamic states are more willing to accept Zionism as there is a common affinity of post-colonial nationalism and as developing states, the Maghreb North African states are more reluctant to do so. The Islamic African states in ECOWAS can assist in narrowing this gap for Israel and have the potential to provide Israel with backdoor diplomacy to Persian Gulf states. Diplomatic ties with Persian Gulf states will also prove once and for all Israel is the Jewish national homeland.

This begs the final somewhat polemic question regarding Netanyahu’s address to the ECOWAS conference “Despite the common ground between ECOWAS and Israel in countering Iranian influence and despite Israel’s aid – will these be sufficient?” Whatever the answer it is clear that sub-Saharan African Islamic states portray a different view to Zionism and express it compared to Maghreb North African Islamic states.

 

 

[1] ECOWAS, http://www.ecowas.int/

[2] Operation Jonathan, https://www.idfblog.com/about-the-idf/history-of-the-idf/1976-operation-entebbe/

[3] Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Pages/default.aspx

[4] Joel Peters, Israel and Africa: The Problematic Friendship, (I.B. Taurus, 1992)

[5]Israel and majority Muslim African country to establish ties. The Jerusalem Post, 20 July 2016. http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-And-Diplomacy/Israel-and-majority-Muslim-African-country-Guinea-to-establish-ties-460944

[6] Somalia received Saudi aid the day it cut ties with Iran, Reuters, 17 January 2016.http://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-saudi-iran-idUSKCN0UV0BH

[7] West African countries fertilize Israel relations through agriculture, Niger Capital, http://nigercapital.info/economie/1517-west-african-countries-fertilize-israel-relations-through-agriculture.html

[8] Nigeria now third most terrorized country in the world. 21 November 2015. http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/193626-nigeria-now-third-most-terrorized-country-in-the-world-report.html

[9] Morocco king boycotts Africa summit over Netanyahu invite. The New Arab, 2 June 2017.https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2017/6/2/morocco-king-boycotts-africa-summit-over-netanyahu-invite

Responding to Mali’s Islamists: Why simplistic counter-terrorism and deradicalization measures will not work – Professor Hussein Solomon

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Responding to Mali’s Islamists: Why simplistic counter-terrorism and deradicalization measures will not work

By Hussein Solomon

RIMA Occasional Papers, Volume 5 (2017), Number 11 (June 2017)

On the 1st of June came news of yet another attack on French soldiers in Mali – this time in Timbuktu. Paris has deployed approximately 1600 troops as part of Operation Barkhane to rid the Sahel of the Islamist threat. These French troops, in turn, are cooperating with the UN mission in Mali or MINUMSA. In response to the June attack, the French have launched several offensives in which scores of jihadists have been killed. In truth, however, these deadly cat and mouse games between intervention forces and the Islamists in Mali have been going on since 2013 – the year Islamists were ousted from their northern Mali stronghold by a French-led intervention force.

Whilst such military operations are an important element at ending the Islamist threat in Mali, more long-term measures are needed to eradicate the scourge of terrorist violence. Some measures which have already begun include deradicalization – focusing on promoting tolerance and respect for the proverbial other whilst embracing a more moderate Islam. The noted Dutch counter-terrorism expert, Alex Schmidt, however reminds us of the limits of such an approach:

“A number of analyses have observed that the study of radicalization on the micro-level has, to some extent, become a substitute for a fuller exploration of the causes of violent extremism and terrorism. So long as the circumstances that produce Islamist radicals’ declared grievances are not taken into account, it is inevitable that the Islamist radical will often appear as a `rebel without a cause’. It appears that by excluding potentially politically awkward factors like `counter-productive counter-terrorism’ from research – especially government-funded research – too much weight has been put on the `radicalization’ of individuals and the micro-level as an explanatory variable”.

To put it differently, not much attention is being paid to the structural reasons giving rise to the radical Islamist phenomenon. With regards to this, consider the fact that the post-independent Malian state has been dominated by the Bambara dominant ethnic group. Indeed, the Bambara effectively control all levers of government – resulting in other ethnic groups feeling left out. This was echoed in a study by the Rand National Defense Research Institute which noted that other minority groups feel left out of Malian national identity. An Arab community leader, for instance, stated, “We need a new definition of the nation that includes us”. This sense of alienation is also felt amongst the Songhai who have formed various organizations to promote their ethnic community interests in opposition to the Malian state. The sense of alienation is felt most acutely amongst the KelTamasheqTuaregs who were construed as the “savage other” in the narrative of the dominant Bambara and Mande.

In such circumstances is it any wonder that these Tuaregs seek to create their own independent homeland of Azawad. In the absence of an overarching Malian national identity, is it any wonder that minority groups have begun to stress that which affirms their own unique identity – ethnic and religious markers. The spread of Islamism can thus be better explained by means of these structural considerations as opposed to radicalization on the micro-level.

The prevailing counter-terrorism and deradicalization discourses also seem oblivious of how a state gains the loyalty of its citizens. Service provision, the Rand study opines, is the primary means by which states legitimize themselves. The failure of Bamako to enhance the socio-economic lives of its citizens therefore is one of the primary reasons for its loss of legitimacy in northern Mali where poverty levels is highest. In this context, Islamists in the form of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Ansar Dine and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa have made great advances as they provide rudimentary services in the areas they control.

Unless greater attention is paid to these structural issues, any intervention force no matter how well-resourced or how robust their mandate will fail to eject the Islamists from Mali.

Is Egypt relevant to Islam and Muslims in Africa? – Dr. Glen Segell

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Is Egypt relevant to Islam and Muslims in Africa?

By Glen Segell

RIMA Occasional Papers, Volume 5 (2017), Number 10 (May 2017)

Posing questions and attempting to answer them about Islam and Muslims in Africa must look towards Egypt as a starting point or even the focal point, as a case separate from others. This is not because Islam is different in Egypt. This is because Egypt is unique in many aspects relating to its demography, geography, and the spotlight on domestic rather than foreign affairs. The answers of many questions would no doubt find that Egypt is inwards rather than outwards focused when considering matters of religion. This is maybe due to the Sahara desert and maybe due to the enormous task relating to governance of its large population.

Demographically Egypt with a population of 92 million is the most populous country in North Africa and the Arab world, the third most populous in Africa and the fifteenth most populous in the world. Worship is well depicted in the ancient hieroglyphics, though those religions have fallen by the wayside. The Abrahamic (belief in one G-d) religion in Egypt is more recent; being well written upon as Moses in the Jewish Bible and the Christian Old Testament.[1] The Islamization of Egypt occurred following the conquest by the Arabs led by Amr ibn Al-Aas in 640 AD.[2] However there are no significant Islamic sites for pilgrimages from other states at the level of Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia.

The 2006 Census in Egypt, counted religion, and informs that over 90% of all Egyptians are Muslims and the vast majority of these are Sunni. A significant number follow Sufi orders, while less follow Ahmadi and even less Mu’tazila orders. Only about 8% of the population is Christian and the rest are Shia Muslims or other faiths such as Jews, and Baha’i. Most Christians belong to the Coptic Orthodox Church of Alexandria, an oriental orthodox church.[3]

It is these minorities and the changing political leadership that are in the spotlight of domestic religious affairs in government policy. Similar to other states in the Middle East, the late 1970s and early 1980s were a turning point towards Islamization. Egypt was a more of a secular country until 1980 when Islam was introduced as the state religion through an amendment to the Constitution. The Constitution also states that all new legislation must conform to Islamic law.[4] There is no indication of sponsoring missionary activities outside of Egypt’s borders.

The constitution offers freedom of religion to the Abrahamic religions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam). [5] In reality policy is not always put into practice; and extremist and radical elements in society don’t necessarily accept government policy; while officials also sometimes turn a blind eye to their activities. Proportionally non-Muslims are minimally represented in public office and are discriminated against in the workforce. Freedom of religion and worship are limited by quasi-government intervention and sectarian conflict. Even since the Arab Spring of 2010 conversions to Islam are accepted but not the reverse; while the majority of prison charges relating to religion are to Christians followed by Shiite Muslims and then atheists.[6]

Slander of the Jewish faith and its adherents is a fixture of contemporary Egyptian life. Anecdotal and statistical evidence puts Egypt in the running for the world’s most anti-Semitic nation: with 98 percent of the public expressing unfavorable opinions of Jews, it exceeds even the accomplished records of its Arab neighbors.[7]

Geographically Egypt is located at the link between Africa and Asia. The most important and closest of Middle East neighbors is Saudi Arabia, the home of the two most important sites in Sunni Islam (Medina and Mecca). The relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia extend back centuries; that between Egypt Eyalet in the Ottoman Empire and the earlier manifestations of Saudi/Wahhabi power in the Arabian Peninsula (Emirate of Diriyah).[8]

The relations have not always been cordial and differences of opinion in the political arena have been seen in Cold War allegiances of Egyptian Abdel Nasser to the Soviet Union, Sadat’s peace with Israel, the Muslim Brotherhood of Morsi, the current Syrian civil war and support of factions in the Yemen conflict. The important point is that Saudi Arabia hasn’t tried to impose its Sunni values on Egypt; the Islamization of Egypt and its policy on religion have been domestic inspired. Clearly the link between religion and politics in the two states can be summed up as “while religion and the religious establishment influence Saudi policy, religion in Egypt is confronted by a revolutionary order.”[9]

Historically Egypt has been an important link between the spread of Islam through Africa through trade including slaves. However the bottom line today is that Egypt is not showing an interest or displaying intent to project Islam or radical or extremist groups into African countries as a government policy or as a policy of any religious group based in Egypt. Maybe the vast expanses of the Sahara desert to the south are a factor. Nevertheless there are extremist groups in the west of Egypt active in Libya and in the Sinai Peninsula.[10]

That leaves Egypt’s significance to Islam and Muslims and Africa as its own demography as the most populous country in North Africa and the Arab world. The overriding concern about Egypt is the persecution of Christian Coptic population.

References:

[1] E. Padilla, P. Phan (ed) Theology of Migration in the Abrahamic Religions, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014)

[2] Abd al-Basit Ahmad, Amr Bin Al-‘Aas Radiya Allah ‘anhu, (Darussalam, 2000)

[3] Egypt. al-Jihāz al-Markazī lil-Tabiah al-Āmmah wa-al-Ihsạ̣̄, Statistical Yearbook, Arab Republic of Egypt, Volume 48, (Cairo: Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statistics, 2008)

[4] Egypt Government, Constitutions of Egypt: Constitution of Egypt, (Cairo: General Books LLC, 2010)

[5] Egypt Government, Constitutions of Egypt: Constitution of Egypt, (Cairo: General Books LLC, 2010)

[6] Moha Ennaji (ed), Multiculturalism and Democracy in North Africa: Aftermath of the Arab Spring, (New York: Routledge, 2014)

[7] Oren Kessler, “Egypt’s Religious Freedom Farce”, The National Interest, May 21, 2015, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/egypts-religious-freedom-farce-12935

[8] Jake Wien, Egypt-Saudi Relations, (Rand Corporation 1980)

[9] Baha Abu-Laban‏ and Sharon MacIrvin Abu, The Arab World: Dynamics and Development, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986)

[10] Dave Dilegge and Robert J. Bunk , Al-Qaeda and Islamic State State Networks, (Small Wars Foundation, 2014)

Economic Circumstances and Radicalisation in Kenya and Nigeria – Dr. Anneli Botha

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Economic Circumstances and Radicalisation in Kenya and Nigeria

By Anneli Botha

RIMA Occasional Papers, Volume 5 (2017), Number 9 (May 2017)

One of the most controversial aspects when discussing the conditions conducive to terrorism is the potential role economic circumstances – especially poverty – plays in radicalisation. It is particularly politicians who tend to be convinced that there is a positive link between poverty, radicalisation and terrorism. On the contrary, a number of academic studies found a negative or limited correlation between economic circumstances and activism and even discovered that some individuals involved in acts of terrorism came from a professional and economically privileged background. For example, in a study conducted on al-Shabaab in Kenya and Somalia and the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) in Kenya, al-Shabaab respondents in Somalia rated the highest with 27% identifying a direct relationship between economic circumstances and their decision to join the organisation. A further 25% of respondents in Somalia combined religion with economic reasons, while a further 1% referred to economic reasons and adventure. In Kenya, 12% of MRC respondent  sand 4% of al-Shabaab respondents specifically referred to economic circumstances as a reason why they joined the respective organisations. These respondents thought by joining these groups, membership would become a career. This places a question mark on the ideological commitment of these individuals. In other words, if respondents had access to other employment opportunities they would not have joined al-Shabaab.

In contrast to Kenya and Somalia another study conducted by Finn Church Aid (FCA) in Nigeria (of which the author was part of), in its sample did not only include interviews with Boko Haram members, but also interviews with individuals representing civil society (referred to as peace builders) and ordinary Nigerian citizens. This project was particularly interesting as it tested perception against reality. One of the perceptions tested was the role economic factors might play in the decision of individuals to join Boko Haram. It was especially peace builders that identified economic circumstances – after religion – in explaining why Boko Haram attracted willing recruits. For example, poverty was identified as the most prominent reason of 26% of peace builders that drove individuals to Boko Haram. This is followed by a lack of education (20%) and employment opportunities Boko Haram offered (16%). This perception is supported by Aghedo and Osumah, who noted in the 2010 census that Yobe State, the headquarters of Boko Haram, has the highest unemployment rate in the country with 33.2%. In contrast to this perception only 15.13% of Boko Haram respondents indicated that they had joined the organization because of poverty and the need to be paid a salary, whereas only 5.88% of former members referred to the employment opportunities the group presented. Only 1.68% of former Boko Haram members considered being frustrated with life as a factor influencing others to join Boko Haram, while 5.88% of Boko Haram respondents were themselves drawn to the organization for this reason. The perception amongst 16% of peace builders and 10,64% of ordinary citizens that individuals join Boko Haram due to the need to be employed was refuted as only 5,88% of Boko Haram respondents joined Boko Haram for the employment opportunities the organization offered. Instead 61 Boko Haram respondents were employed and 58 respondents indicated that they were unemployed at the time of joining Boko Haram.

Despite the fact that economic circumstances, and most notably poverty is not a main contributing factor towards radicalisation, the relation between socioeconomic circumstances and other forms of marginalisation – most notably political, ethnic and religious circumstances and differences – requires closer scrutiny. Instead of the immediate connotation with poverty, the discussion on economic conditions needs to extend well beyond only poverty. It is these other indicators that rather ‘facilitate’ or provide favourable circumstances for recruitment. These for example include, unequal access to resources, the growing divide between rich and poor and limited education and employment opportunities.

Although linking radicalisation and poverty is unfounded, the introduction of the concept ‘relative deprivation’ by Ted Gurr holds more water in explaining why people turn to violence. According to Gurr the relative deprivation theory consists of two key components: Firstly, the perception of inequality, or a perceived discrepancy between one’s own position and that of others; and secondly, the implication related to perceived inequality or, to put it differently, the intensity or degree of inequality. These circumstances contribute to defining in- and out- groups. If what is expected exceeds that which a person has or experiences, the next question in that formula will be: what will the costs be to balance the scales?

Relative deprivation alone is however not sufficient, it requires another element in addition to the difference between the rewards people expect versus which they receive in transferring ‘I’ to ‘us’: This comes in the form of marginalisation based on ethnic, religious or class differences in which the group feels that collective violence is a legitimate and considered the only response available to balance the scales. When economic progress and political representation visibly divide people based on ethnic or tribal and religious differences, the possibility for violence and terrorism increases. Considering that immediate circumstances often serve as the trigger, it is not surprising that based on these differences, self-determination groups are formed. In addition to relative deprivation, the possibility of success further contributes to vulnerability. Thus explaining why it is commonly accepted that weak, failed and collapsed states are particularly more vulnerable to the possibility of political violence and terrorism. The possibility of achieving its objectives increases when the state no longer has a monopoly on the use of force, and that is when the probability of resorting to violence becomes plausible especially under the youth. Uneven development and subsequent relative deprivation, played a prominent role among MRC respondents in joining these organisations, with 14% of MRC respondents  referring to a combination of ethnic and economic reasons. Respondents who mentioned economic circumstances specifically referred to situations where increased economic disparities occur within identifiable ethnic, religious and geographic groups. Education and the type of employment provided additional insights and should be used as valuable indicators, considering that when respondents were also asked to indicate their level of education, 67% of MRC and 47% of al-Shabaab respondents only had a primary school education. It was therefore not surprising that 75% of MRC and 46% of al-Shabaab respondents in Kenya were in low-income careers. These two factors directly impact on upward mobility, especially when the perception exists that these discrepancies are based on a religious, ethnic or geographical divide. The MRC in Kenya most prominently referred to a comparison between the economic circumstances of coastal people versus those in other parts of the country, but more specifically the discrimination they experience in comparison to outsiders living in ‘their’ region. Similarly, the economic divide in Nigeria between north and south on religious, but also ethnic terms had a similar impact on the emergence of Islamist extremism in the north. Consequently, relative deprivation became a political issue and a driving factor behind frustration and radicalisation. Therefore, monitoring socioeconomic trends in preventing radicalisation will be useful where there are economic disparities within identifiable ethnic, religious and geographic groups.

It is also not surprising that extremist movements specifically target the youth and young adults between the ages 15 to 25. Being naturally impatient, their frustration can easily lead to action. Young people are not only more susceptible to indoctrination, they are also more inclined to get physically involved.

Unequal social upward mobility based on religious, ethnical or even political differences therefore requires serious attention in identifying communities at risk. Indicators that will be particularly useful are population growth, access to public service, uneven development, urbanisation and uneven unemployment and education opportunities – especially if these are based on religious, ethnic or any other identifiable categories. These factors will contribute not only to social conflict, but also to that country or community’s vulnerability to radicalisation. In addition to encouraging economic development, government also has to step up to its responsibility to provide basic services for all people, and especially to communities that are regarded as marginalised.

Governments need guidance and assistance in creating an environment that encourages innovation. Much is still needed to equip young people, not only to be better educated, but also to recognise their role in the financial health of their country. Although low-interest loans are often referred to as a solution, the ultimate success of these and other initiatives will depend on the level and the type of education and the prospect of a better future not determined by a person’s religious or ethnic association.

A Collaboration between CEAPS and RIMA

CEAPS

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A Collaboration between CEAPS and RIMA

May 2017

On May 1, 2017, the Centre for the Engagement on African Peace and Security (CEAPS) — which is a partnership between the Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP, Osaka University, Japan) and the Faculty of the Humanities at the University of the Free State (South Africa) — and the Think Tank for the Research of Islam and Muslims in Africa (RIMA) agreed to collaborate and strengthen the work of their respective institutes.

The areas of collaboration are focused on the engagement of the Middle Eastern countries, especially the Gulf countries and Egypt, in Africa; the engagement of Turkey and Iran in Africa; the engagement of other international players in Africa (China, India, Russia, the US, the EU, France, Latin America, etc.); radical Islam and terrorism in Africa; environmental security; the nexus between climate change and conflict throughout Africa; environmental refugees; migration. The areas of collaboration include also the advancement of understanding and knowledge concerning Islam in Africa and Muslim countries and communities in Africa and the Diaspora, especially as they relate to peace and security.

The joint activities will include but will not be limited to: research and policy analysis; policy dialogues; knowledge dissemination; academic exchanges and mutual visits; joint research and publication; joint organization of conferences, seminars and workshops; etc.

The link to the CEAPS website is: http://www.ceaps.info/

The war against Al Shabaab is being lost – Professor Hussein Solomon

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The war against Al Shabaab is being lost

By Hussein Solomon

RIMA Occasional Papers, Volume 5 (2017), Number 8 (May 2017)

If one were to take the words of James ole Seriani at face value, one would believe that Al Shabaab’s demise is imminent. Seriani is the director of Operation Linda Boni, an operation aimed to eradicate the threat posed by Al Shabaab militants in the Boni Forest. “For the past seven months, we haven’t experienced any attacks or attempts from Al Shabaab. This proves that the operation is successful,” he proudly declared. In the process Seriani seems to ignore the simple fact that such a counter-insurgency operation cannot be measured in such a short time frame. Moreover, he seems to have forgotten that local herders were removed from Boni Forest thereby turning local public opinion against the security forces.

Indeed if one believed the Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) one would also believe that Al Shabaab’s days were numbered. On 28th April 2017, the KDF announced that its aircraft bombed an Al Shabaab camp near El Wak in the War-Gaduud area killing several of its fighters including the group’s deputy commander of the Gedo region, Ali Shangalow. This aerial attack followed a KDF ground offensive a week earlier in which another 52 Al Shabaab fighters were killed.

On the other hand Al Shabaab began 2017 with an attack on a Kenyan military base at Kolbiyow in Somalia’s Lower Juba region which killed 57 Kenyan soldiers and where military equipment was also captured by the Islamist militants. Indeed, over the past two years Al Shabaab has attacked several bases of those forming part of the 22,000 strong African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) force waging a tough war against it. Burundian soldiers at its Lego base were attacked as were Ugandan troops in Janale and the KDF once again at El Adde. In each case heavy casualties were inflicted and military equipment was captured by Al Shabaab. It is not only the foreign forces arrayed against it which has been the target of Al Shabaab’s wrath, but also local forces. On 23 April 2017, an improvised explosive device (IED) was detonated as a military truck belonging to security forces of the semi-autonomous region of Puntland passed by. Six soldiers were killed and a further eight were wounded.

Meanwhile, the weakness of the Somali government was aptly demonstrated when a car bomb exploded in a busy market in the capital Mogadishu in February 2017. 39 people were killed and 50 injured in this terrorist atrocity. What is clear is that Mogadishu is heavily reliant on foreign forces to keep itself in power. Far from using the years of external intervention to build up its own security forces to take the fight to Al Shabaab, successive Somali governments did very little to fix their ailing security apparatus. As a result when a foreign force removes itself from the Somali theatre, control is quickly lost. When Ethiopian troops withdrew from the town of Gal’ad in the central region of Galguduud in July 2016, Somalia’s soldiers withdrew shortly thereafter, allowing Al Shabaab to once more take control of the town.

The seriousness of the current situation is perhaps illustrated by the fact that the Trump administration plans to pursue expanded military involvement in the quagmire that is Somalia. The Pentagon is considering more US Special Forces in the Somali theatre as well as greater numbers of pre-emptive airstrikes. Will it work? Given Somalia’s historic antipathy towards a foreign military presence, the answer is perhaps not. Moreover, the increased US involvement may well serve to incense Somali public opinion – and thereby provide more recruits for Al Shabaab.

Whilst the military option can and should be used, it needs to be part of a broader more holistic response to the very real threat posed by Al Shabaab. Consider the following fact: the internal weaknesses within Al Shabaab have not been exploited in any systematic manner. In November 2016, for instance, Al Shabaab attempted to impose taxes on the hapless residents of Harardhere. They rebelled. Villagers ambushed Al Shabaab fighters, including destroying one of their armoured vehicles. There has been no concerted attempt on the part of either the Somali government or AMISOM to capitalize on these tensions.

The lack of a comprehensive response to Al Shabaab is also seen in the current famine crisis engulfing Somalia. Half of the country’s population is facing acute food shortages. In March 2017, it was reported that the United Nations’ US $864 million humanitarian appeal was only 31 percent funded. Al Shabaab, by contrast was distributing food in six central and southern regions of Bay, Bakol, Mudug, Hiraan, Lower Shabelle, and Galgudug – in the process winning hearts and minds. If the international community was serious about the fight against Al Shabaab militants, they would be the ones meeting the nutritional requirements of ordinary Somalis – not allowing Al Shabaab to score brownie points.

Under the circumstances, it is no wonder that the war against Al Shabaab is being lost.