Analyzing Terrorism in Africa: Pitfalls and Context – Professor Hussein Solomon

Analyzing terrorism in Africa: Pitfalls and Context

by Hussein Solomon

Volume 10 (2022), Number 9 (November 2022)

This past week, I found myself making an input for counter-terrorism analysts of the African Union.  It was hosted by the Algiers-based African Centre of the Study and Research on Terrorism which is a key structure of the African Union in the fight against terrorism on the continent. What follows is my presentation to this august body on analyzing and contextualizing terrorism in the African context.

When former US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld was asked in February 2002 that Saddam Hussein was supplying weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups, he responded, “There are known knowns — there are things we know we know,” We also know there are known unknowns — that is to say, we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns, the ones we don’t know we don’t know.”

I reflected on Rumsfeld’s quote on 26^th October 2022 when the US Embassy in Pretoria issued a “terrorist attack alert” warning of an imminent attack in Sandton, South Africa. Amongst the alleged targets was a Gay Pride Parade and a performance by a Jewish comedian. The Australian, Canadian and UK High Commissions soon followed the American example – issuing terror alerts of their own. The South African government was incensed since they claimed that the Americans never consulted with them. Subsequently it emerged that the South Africans had met with the CIA. Pretoria also claimed that its intelligence services which is constantly monitoring threats were unaware of any threat posed to the gatherings taking place in Sandton. However, there were subsequent media reports where anonymous South African intelligence sources complained that a threat had surfaced and because the Americans made the announcement prematurely, 6 months of intelligence work was blown apart. So, was there a terror threat or not? To make matters worse, various South African analysts claimed that the terror alert had nothing to do with the threat of terrorism and more an attempt by Washington to pressurize South Africa to leave the BRICS alliance.

In this situation of claims vs counter-claims, it is difficult for the analyst to come to know which of the claims is an accurate depiction of reality. Analysis of terrorism is difficult. Why? Because officials lie, states lie and terrorist groups lie. States, for instance, either understate or overstate the magnitude of terrorism in their countries for their own reasons. Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni, for instance, attempted to accentuate the linkages between Al Qaeda and domestic terror groups like the West Nile Bank Front and the Lord’s Resistance Army with a view to soliciting international support. Other countries have made use of anti-terror legislation to crush legitimate dissent as they seek to thwart the democratic aspirations of their people whilst tenaciously hanging onto power.

Worse, these countries feed tainted information to the AU on what is supposedly going on in their countries. Of course, if the AU formulates policies on this tainted information and acts on it, failure is inevitable. States, of course, are not alone in this. Terror groups often claim responsibility for a successful terror attack committed by other groups to enhance their stature. This is especially true given the rivalry between the various Al Qaeda and Islamic State franchises across Africa.

The key here is to approach all data with a cynical attitude and to have multiple data points when analyzing terrorist acts or groups. Trust nothing you see. Question everything, keep an emotional distance from your subject matter, be aware of your own bias, try to rise above the fact that you hail from a certain country, or that you are an adherent of a particular religious faith. Perhaps, most difficult of all, maintain your independent analysis even if your superiors expect another outcome in your analysis.

On this point, let me make a recommendation to you. I have been working on issues of terrorism for the past 30 years. Some time back a senior general brought me in to assist with analysis of data coming in from the field. I was surprised since I knew the general had several analysts on his team. When I asked him about it, he smiled and said it is to prevent “group think”. I think the AU could consider a team of vetted academics who look at the data and possibly give alternative analyses. Colleagues, let us be frank we are failing 1.2 billion Africans in providing security. If you look at the Global Terrorism Index, whilst terrorist incidents are decreasing elsewhere, they are increasing on the African continent. Terror groups are proliferating, attacks are becoming more lethal and more sophisticated. It is time to acknowledge that our current approaches are flawed.

Perhaps, more than analyzing the information presented to you, is to look for the information not there. These omissions can only be identified by having analysts who have specialized in their subject. I was once asked to give advice to a security agency and I quickly discovered that there were musical chairs being played with an analyst working the North Africa desk today, the Horn of Africa desk a few months later and so on. At this agency, some analysts did not even speak the local language at the desk they were responsible for. This is a recipe for disaster.

In concrete terms, what do I mean by omissions? I once attended a workshop consisting of senior security officials from across the continent where counter-terrorism was discussed. At no point was the growing criminalization of the African state discussed and the terrorists’ exploitation of this. In Somalia, meanwhile, arms meant for the Somali National Army have miraculously found their way into the hands of Al Shabaab fighters. In Nigeria, former President Goodluck Jonathan bemoaned the fact that Boko Haram has penetrated the security forces and the political apparatus of state.

A key issue of analysis is asking the right questions. Again, this can only happen if the analysts are specialists. Consider doing an analysis on Al Shabaab and not asking why 70% of its fighters emanates from the Rahanweyn-Digil clans?

Effective analysis in my view is not trapped in the moment. It understands the larger socio-political, economic and historic context of current developments. When considering Tuareg recruitment into militant groups, economic context is important. It matters that the average poverty rate in Mali is 64% whilst it is much higher in northern Mali. Timbuktu has a poverty rate of 77%. For Gao, the figure is 78.7% and for Kidal a staggering 92%. Small wonder that when Ansar Dine first started, they demanded an end to poverty and for dignity to be restored to every citizen in northern Mali through economic development. The involvement of Tuaregs in various Islamist groupings should also be contextualized in historical terms considering their rebellions between 1963-64, 1990-1996, 2006-09 and since January 2012. This is important since the Global Terrorism Index makes clear the intimate relationship between the emergence of terrorism and countries already experiencing conflict. 96% of all terrorism related deaths occurred in countries already experiencing other forms of conflict.

True analysis has to steer away from adopting simplistic stereotypes such as an Islamic fundamentalism vs liberal democratic politics as one French security official told me. There is a complexity regarding identity politics in Africa. Consider here the case of the 4,000 strong Macina Liberation Front (MLF) which instrumentalizes the Islamic faith for reasons of ethnocentric nationalism. This is an ethnic Fulani (also called Peul) movement that seeks to revive the 19^th century Macina Empire. There are 20 million Fulani spread across the Sahel and the MLF recruits from among them. The same could be said of the Kanuri-dominated Boko Haram which recruits not only from the 7 million Kanuri in Nigeria, but also from among the 1,1 million Kanuri in Chad, the 850,000 in Niger and the 56,000 Kanuri in Cameroon. In an effort to broaden its appeal, Boko Haram has also reached out to Hausa-Fulani peoples across the region, but the upper echelons of the movement remain Kanuri-dominated.

Finally, nothing exists in a vacuum. We are all shaped by our histories and this is clearly evident in the case of West Africa and the Sahel. Much of mainstream accounts ignore the historical roots of jihad in this volatile region. Consider for instance the jihad embarked upon in the Senegal River Valley in 1673 as well as the jihadi roots of the Fulani uprisings starting in Futa Jallon in 1725 and ending in Macina in 1818. The formation of the Toucouleur Empire of El Hadj Umar Tall from 1856 to 1861 also had its basis in jihad. The most impressive of these jihads was undoubtedly that of Fulani scholar, Uthman dan Fodio, which began in 1804 and established a caliphate that endured until the arrival of the British in 1903. This brief historical overview is important for two reasons. First, the fact that historically jihad has emerged from within these societies suggest that it is not something alien to these societies and not necessarily an import from the Middle East. Moreover, latter day jihadis in the form of Boko Haram look for inspiration from Uthman dan Fodio’s jihad in the 19^th century and deliberately seek to emulate his campaign in their struggle against Abuja.

I started this presentation with a quote from former US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, allow me to end this presentation with a quote from my favorite author, Salman Rushdie, who wrote: “The only people who see the whole picture are the ones who step outside the frame.” As analysts, I appeal to you to step outside the frame.