Professor Hussein Solomon – Boko Haram vs Islamic State

Boko Haram vs Islamic State

by Hussein Solomon

Centre for Gender and Africa Studies, University of the Free State

Volume 12 (2024), Number 2 (January 2024)

It was supposed to be a surprise attack. On 15^th January 2024, heavily armed fighters of the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) quickly crammed themselves into seven canoes and stealthily approached the islands of Kandahar and Kaduna Ruwa just off the shores of Lake Chad. Their objective was the camp of Abou Huraryra, the leader of the Buduma wing of Boko Haram. Whilst initially having the element of surprise, ISWAP fighters soon found themselves on the backfoot as Boko Haram fighters regrouped. The battle between the militants lasted an hour. The ferocity of their engagement was evinced by the dozens of corpses which lay on the blood-soaked grass afterwards. ISWAP fighters soon retreated in only two canoes half-filled with wounded and demoralized men.

So, what accounts for these growing conflicts between the Islamist militants? In 2016, a split occurred inside Boko Haram on questions of tactics and leadership. Some within Boko Haram were appalled at the indiscriminate killing of civilians, especially fellow Muslims by their then leader, Abubakar Shekau. They argued that the orgy of violence he unleashed against other Muslims will result in drying up recruitment into their ranks. The criticism soon morphed into some openly rebelling against Shekau’s leadership generally and these forming Islamic State – West Africa Province under the leadership of Abu Musab al Barnawi. Boko Haram or, perhaps more correctly Jama’atu Ahli Sunna Lidda’adati wal-Jihad (Group of the People for Sunnah and Jihad) remained under the leadership of Shekau.  

ISWAP has subsequently grown to 3,500 fighters – the largest of Islamic State’s affiliates in Africa – and is active in north-eastern Nigeria, on the border between Nigeria and Cameroon, the Lake Chad Basin as well as making inroads into southern Nigeria. Estimates of Boko Haram’s strength vary depending on sources between 6,000 and 20,000. Their areas of operations include north-eastern Nigeria, Chad, Niger, Mali and Cameroon. Given their overlapping areas of operations, perhaps it was inevitable that the two groups will clash. This clash increasingly has to do with the lucrative kidnappings for ransom operations as well as illicit contraband moving through the Lake Chad Basin. In this sense, it is difficult to separate Islamism and criminality in the region. These are intertwined. Whilst globally, terrorists have made use of criminality to fund their operations; often the lure of profit from criminal enterprise overcomes the original purpose of the organization.

Given the prevailing regional conflict system existing in the Sahel as well as toxic nature of identity politics, the attack on the 15^th January is bound to further escalate tensions. The Boko Haram camp attacked were all Buduma and this ethnic group can be found across all four Lake Chad Basin countries: Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. Expect reprisal attacks on those ethnic groups supporting ISWAP. Despite not having won the military victory sought in the attack, ISWAP has secured the allegiance of many in the neglected communities in the Lake Chad Basin by digging wells, attempting to prevent cattle rustling and providing some semblance of health care to locals in exchange for a “tax”.

The 15^th January attack has however underlined the fragmentation of terror groups operating in the region – a fact that the governments has sadly been slow to exploit.