“African Solutions for African Problems” and Sahel-West African Terrorism – Professor Hussein Solomon

“African Solutions for African Problems” and Sahel-West African Terrorism

by Hussein Solomon

RIMA Occasional Papers, Volume 5 (2017), Number 17 (September 2017)

In an ideal world, the protection of civilians lay with their governments and not with foreign actors. In an ideal world, too, classical notions that the state has the monopoly over coercive force within its territorial boundaries will also hold sway. We do not however live in an ideal world. On the 13^th August 2017 a restaurant in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso was attacked by Islamist terrorists. 18 people were killed and 20 injured. The very next day in Mali an attack on the UN mission there killed seven. In recent years the Sahel and West African region has played host to a number of terrorist groups such as Boko Haram, Ansar Dine, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Murabitoun, and Ansarul Islam. States in the region have been unable to halt the bloodshed or the proliferation of these militant Islamist groupings.

In a globalizing world, insecurity anywhere threatens security everywhere. Understanding the importance of putting a stop to the Islamist cancer in the region, the US got involved in 2005 with the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI). There is also a recognition on the part of the states in the region that they cannot individually respond to the transnational threat posed. Consequently Mali and Burkina Faso have joined forces with other Sahel countries–Chad, Mauritania and Niger -to form the G-5 Sahel grouping which is a 5,000-strong joint force which is to be fully operational in September 2017. The European Union plans to provide 50 million euros assistance to these troops whilst Germany and France has agreed to provide training and infrastructure to the G-5 Sahel force. This assistance on the part of Berlin and Paris also includes the supply of weapons, ammunition and military vehicles. Burkina Faso has already accepted Germany’s offer to train its soldiers and approximately 1000 German troops are already in Mali. French forces, of course, have been in Mali for some time, whilst an even larger deployment of French troops is in the Central African Republic.

There are some critics who have decried this Western involvement in the region stressing “African solutions for African problems” – that one should work through the African Union and its constituent Regional Economic Communities (RECS).In West Africa such a REC is the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Whilst this is indeed a noble position, African solutions are patently not working. The African Union’s proposed African Standby Force (ASF) has not gotten off the drawing board and ECOWAS’ security arm is dysfunctional. A brief review of recent history will suffice to underline the point.

The moribund nature of the RECs became all too apparent in 2012 when Islamists captured northern Mali. The UN Security Council passed a resolution – UNSC Resolution 2071 – on 12 October 2012 calling on ECOWAS to prepare an international intervention force and giving them 45 days to lay out detailed plans^[1]. On 7 November 2012, West African army chiefs adopted a plan to expel Islamists from northern Mali. The plan was that 3,000 West African troops would target the main population centres in northern Mali. Nigerian soldiers were to make up the bulk of the force while Senegal, Burkina Faso and Niger contributed 500 troops each^[2]. This military blueprint was subsequently passed by the ECOWAS regional heads of state. On 26 November 2012, this blueprint was formally presented to, and adopted by the UN Security Council^[3]. France, meanwhile, undertook to provide `logistical aid’ to the ECOWAS force and began training the Malian armed forces with a view to retaking the north^[4].

While cumbersome  diplomatic processes for authorisations and other necessities were taking place, the Islamists of Ansar Dine, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) moved rapidly southwards from their northern strongholds to capture the town of Konna – only a few hundred kilometres north of the capital, Bamako. Worse was the fact that Islamists, having consolidated their position in Konna, began their advance on Mopti, the last major town before reaching the capital. Clearly processes need to be streamlined for sub-regional, regional and international responses to deal with jihadists threats sooner rather than later. Commenting on this issue, Bill Roggio noted that “…any delay in taking action in northern Mali has given the jihadists an opportunity to indoctrinate, train, and organize recruits from West African nations, and then send them home to establish networks there”^[5].

On realising that if Mopti fell Bamako would be next, former French President Francois Hollande decided to act by launching Operation Serval in January 2013. This began with aerial strikes of the Islamists’ positions in Konna by French helicopter gunships and mirage jets of the French 4^th Helicopter Combat Regiment of Pau, which were based in Burkina Faso^[6]. Meanwhile, French soldiers based in neighbouring Chad and the Ivory Coast moved rapidly to protect Mopti while dislodging the Islamists from Konna and, eventually, Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu^[7].

The pace of events clearly wrong-footed ECOWAS and the 15-member West African bloc had to scramble to send in a force to join the French. Eventually, with other countries like Benin pledging 300 soldiers, the ECOWAS force reached 4,000 and was deployed in northern Mali^[8]. As ECOWAS did not have a proper airlift capability, the British sent two military transport aircraft to transport the ECOWAS troops and equipment into Mali^[9]. If anything proves that the AU’s much vaunted Peace and Security Architecture, based on the RECs, is little more than a paper tiger, it is this Malian debacle.

Critics of Western involvement in the region, need to ask themselves who speaks for the victims of terrorism? If AU structures – continental and regional – are unable to stop the carnage, surely we need to look at alternative avenues to protect the innocent?

 

[1]‘Malians Protest Foreign Intervention Plans’, News24, 18 October 2012, http://www.news24.com/malians-protest-foreign-intervention-plans. Date accessed: 29 August 2017.

[2]Juan Cole, ‘France, ECOWAS Intervene in Mali to Halt Advance of Radical Fundamentalists’, Informed Comment, 13 January 2013, http://www.juan-cole.com/2013/01/intervene-advance-fundamentalists.html. Date accessed: 20 August 2017.

[3]Serge Daniel, ‘Mali Military Intervention Strategy Adopted,’ Middle East Online, 7 November 2012, http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=55438. Date accessed: 21 August 2017.

[4]`Mali Crisis: France to Give “Logistical Aid”, News24, 16 October 2012, http://www.news24.com/mali-crisis-france-to-give-logistical-aid. Date accessed: 24 August 2017.

[5] Bill Roggio, `US, UN Add Ansar Dine to List of Terror Groups,’ The Long War Journal, 21 March 2013, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/03/us_adds_ansar_dine_t.phph#xzz2tr56oE2c, Date accessed: 25 August 2017.

[6]Cole, `France, ECOWAS Intervene in Malito Halt Advance of Radical Fundamentalists’.

[7]`Africa, French Forces Target Ansar Al-Din’, Maghrebia, 13 January 2013, http://maghrebia.com/en_GB/articles/awi/newsbriefs/general/2013/01/13/newsbrief-01, Date accessed: 28 August 2017.

[8]Ibid.

[9]Ibid.